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OWNING STOCK WHILE MAKING LAW:
AN AGENCY PROBLEM AND A FIDUCIARY SOLUTION
Donna M. Nagy*

INTRODUCTION
Whether the decision making occurs inside a corporate
boardroom or on Capitol Hill, acts of governing precipitate agency
problems. Agency theory rests on the conflicts of interest that exist
when one party (an agent) has been entrusted with the discretion to
make decisions that affect and bind another party (a principal).1
Those conflicts arise in the corporate world, where shareholders
entrust boards of directors to manage corporations. Those conflicts
are also present in the political world, where citizens entrust
politicians to manage the government. The fundamental challenges
in each context lie in motivating agents to act in their principals'
best interest and reducing the costs of monitoring.
Confronted with comparable agency problems, shareholders and
citizens look to similar fixes. Elections, for example, motivate
agents to specify ex ante how they plan to exercise their power and
discretion. And, at least in theory, agents who fail to honor their
promises or otherwise act unfaithfully decrease their chances of
returning to service. 2
Fiduciary obligations provide another

*

Interim Executive Associate Dean and C.Ben Dutton Professor of Law,

Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington. I presented this
Article at Agency Theory: Still Viable?, a symposium inspired by the work of
Professor Michael Jensen, at Wake Forest University School of Law on March
22, 2013. I am grateful to Professor Jensen and Professor Alan Palmiter, the
student editors, and my fellow symposium participants. The Article also has
benefited from helpful insights and comments by Professors Kathleen Clark,
Tamar Frankel, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Charles Geyh, Dawn Johnsen, Richard
Painter, and Margaret Sachs, and from excellent research assistance by
Reference Librarian Jennifer Morgan and Helen Arnold, J.D. '13.
1. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON.
305, 308 (1976).
2. For an often-cited study challenging this theory, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise,93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688 (2007)
(evidencing that successful electoral challenges to incumbent directors are
"quite rare" and concluding that "even when shareholder dissatisfaction with
board actions and decisions is substantial, challengers face considerable
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important mechanism for mitigating agency problems. This is seen
in corporate law, which imposes fiduciary duties on corporate
officials and allows the corporation (and sometimes its shareholders)
to enforce those obligations in court. But while the idea of
lawmakers as fiduciaries is hardly a new one, 3 the implementation
and enforcement of fiduciary principles-most particularly the
fiduciary duty of loyalty-is frequently overlooked as a meaningful
supplement for the imperfect and incomplete checks on agency
problems provided by legislative elections.4
This Article focuses on members of Congress and their
widespread practice of holding personal investments in companies
that are directly and substantially affected by their legislative

impediments to replacing boards"). For analysis pertaining to lawmakers, see
Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Effects of Redistrictingon
Incumbents, 11 ELECTION L.J. 490, 490 (2012) (observing that "[s]itting
legislators, when they run for reelection, evidently enjoy substantial electoral
advantages, which are manifest both in voters' behavior and in aggregate rates
of electoral competition and legislative turnover").
3. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAw 279 (2011) (emphasizing that
private sector fiduciaries and public sector officials are governed by the same
guiding principles, which are designed to "prevent misappropriation of
entrustment and ensure a diligent and expert performance of services");
RICHARD W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES: How
ETHICS REFORM CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 2-4 (2009) (stating that "[p]ersons who

choose elected officials are entrustors to whom officials owe fiduciary
obligations" and observing that the principles of transparency and
accountability in private law are equally essential to the public law regulating
government officials). For law review articles recognizing that government
officials are fiduciaries who operate under strict limitations when using
government power and property, see, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough
Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 57 (1996); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 845 (2013); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52
BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126
HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013).
4. See PAINTER, supra note 3, at 5 (observing that corporate managers and
government officials share "the power of incumbency," and bemoaning that,
"[i]n both contexts, poorly performing fiduciaries are often hard to get rid of').
For additional commentary highlighting the agency problems common to
corporate and public governance, see, e.g., Claire Hill & Richard Painter,
Compromised Fiduciaries:Conflicts of Interest in Government and Business, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1637 (2011) (analyzing the 2008 government bailout of financial
institutions and encouraging greater attention to structural biases in future
decision making concerning the economy); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50
STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (envisioning a greater role for courts in reviewing
political arrangements that entrench incumbents and thwart challengers);
Rave, supra note 3 (examining the practice of gerrymandering and proposing
that redistricting plans be subject to either voter ratification or judicial review
for "entire fairness").
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activity. Whether entirely accurate or not, congressional officials
with investment portfolios chock-full of corporate stocks and bonds
contribute to a corrosive belief that lawmakers can-and often doplace their personal financial interests ahead of the public they
serve. This classic agency problem has been depicted in front-page
news stories with jarring headlines. 5 But despite the media
attention and an all-time low in public approval ratings, members of
Congress continue to own and actively trade securities totaling
hundreds of millions of dollars in companies directly impacted by
Beyond that, the membership of many
legislative actions.
holds
disproportionately
large
congressional
committees
investments in the industries and companies subject to their
oversight.6
Such blatant conflicts of interest constitute standard
congressional fare because the federal financial conflict statutes
guarding against self-interested decision making by executive and
judicial branch officials do not apply to Congress. To be sure, both
the Senate and the House of Representatives have ethics rules that
prohibit members from deriving personal financial gain from their
congressional service. But long-standing interpretations of those
rules allow lawmakers to work on and vote on legislation impacting
their own personal investments provided they are not the sole
beneficiaries of that legislation (or part of a highly circumscribed
class of beneficiaries). This sole/limited beneficiary gloss insulates
lawmakers from the fiduciary principles that would otherwise
operate to restrict their personal investment practices. The federal
government's recent and unprecedented involvement with financial
markets and private-sector businesses (such as banks, health care
providers/insurers, and automobile manufacturers), and the sheer

5. Journalists from the Washington Post have provided the most extensive
reporting to date. See, e.g., Scott Higham et al., Senate Panel Ban Seen as
Double Standard, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2010, at Al; Paul Kane, Lawmakers
Reveal Health-Care Investments, WASH. PosT, June 13, 2009, at Al; Dan
Keating et al., Legislators Traded Millions in Stocks They Could Impact, WASH.
PosT, June 24, 2012, at Al; Kimberly Kindy et al., PersonalInterests, Bills Can
Overlap, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2012, at Al; Kimberly Kindy & Robert E.
O'Harrow Jr., The Dingells and GM Illustrate a Capitol Hill Quandary, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 11, 2010, at Al; Robert O'Harrow Jr. et al., Policy, Portfolios and the
Investor Lawmaker, WASH. PosT, Nov. 23, 2009, at Al; Robert O'Harrow Jr. &
Dan Keating, When Public Duties and Private Investments Intersect, WASH.
PosT, June 14, 2010, at Al. Some of these, as well as other, investment
practices have been scrutinized in a controversial book. See generally PETER
SCHWEIZER, THROW THEM ALL ouT: How POLITICIANS AND THEIR FRIENDS GET
RICH OFF INSIDER STOCK TIPS, LAND DEALS, AND CRONYISM THAT WouLD SEND
THE REST OF Us TO PRISON (2011).

6. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.

570

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

volume of stock that lawmakers own in publicly traded companies,
render this insulation more troubling than ever before.
Change is not only desirable but also possible. The recently
enacted Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge ("STOCK") Act
amends the federal securities laws to reflect a basic fiduciary
principle: that all federal officials, including members of Congress,
owe duties of trust and confidence to the federal government and its
citizens with respect to material nonpublic information obtained in
connection with their government service. 7 The STOCK Act, which
passed Congress with landslide votes of 96-3 in the Senate and 4172 in the House,8 owes its statutory life to the public outcry that was
generated by a 60 Minutes segment claiming that congressional
insider trading was "perfectly legal."9 Heightened media attention
to the overlap between lawmakers' investments and their legislative
activity,' 0 coupled with the increased transparency stemming from
the STOCK Act's requirements for the prompt reporting of securities
transactions, could well ignite a comparable demand for financial
conflict-of-interest reform. President Obama provided the opening
salvo in his 2012 State of the Union Address when he called for new
legislation that would reduce the "deficit of trust" between
Washington, D.C. and the rest of the country by prohibiting "any
elected official from owning stocks in industries they impact.""
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the
fiduciary duty of loyalty and briefly explains how it guards against
self-interested decision making by a corporation's directors. Part II
examines the strict statutory schemes that regulate financial
conflicts of interest in the executive and judicial branches. These
two parts share common themes, and it is hardly a coincidence that
many fundamental insights pertaining to ethics regulation in the
executive branch stem from a study performed more than fifty years
ago by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York

7. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge ("STOCK") Act of 2012, Pub.

L. No. 112-105, §§ 4(b), 9(b), 126 Stat. 291 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g)-(h)).
The STOCK Act further specifies that members of Congress and congressional
employees owe a duty to Congress itself. Id. § 4(b).
8. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
9. See 60 Minutes: Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information? (CBS
television broadcast Nov. 13, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301
-18560_162-57323527/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information
("For now,
the practice is perfectly legal, but some say it's time for the law to change.").
10. See infra text accompanying notes 236-42 (discussing recent studies
and investigative reports).
11. President Barack Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress
on the State of the Union, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 48 (Jan. 24,
2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200048/pdflDCPD
-201200048.pdf; see also infra text accompanying
President's remarks on signing the STOCK Act).

note 272 (quoting the
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("NYCBA")1 2 under the direction of two persons now widely regarded
as intellectual giants in the field of corporate law: American Law
Institute President Emeritus Roswell Perkins, who supervised the
ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 13 and the late
Bayless Manning, 14 a former Dean of Stanford Law School, famous
for his pioneering scholarship on legal capital.15
In 1970, a
successor committee published a follow-up study that focused on
conflicts of interest and ethics standards in the legislative branch.16
Part III shifts the focus to the legislative branch and evaluates
the very different set of ethics rules and norms that Congress has
traditionally applied-and continues to apply-to the financial
investments held by its members and employees. Part III then
analyzes the rationales put forth by lawmakers to justify the view
that their financial conflicts are best deterred through public
disclosure of personal investments and the discipline of the electoral
process. It also provides a contemporary snapshot of lawmakers as
stock market investors.

12. See generally SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FED. CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS,
Ass'N. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL
SERVICE (1960) [hereinafter NYCBA 1960 REPORT].
13. Roswell Perkins served as the Chairman of the NYCBA Special
Committee on the Federal Conflict of Laws. See id. at xii; see also Federal

Conflict of Interest Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1900, H.R. 2156, H.R. 2157,
H.R. 7556, and H.R. 10575 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. (Subcomm. No. 5) of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 383 (1960) (testimony of Roswell B.
Perkins); Roswell B. Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1963).
14. Dean Manning served as Staff Director of the NYCBA's Special
Committee on the Federal Conflict of Interest Laws and, in 1961, as a member
of President Kennedy's Advisory Panel on Ethics and Conflicts of Interest in
Government. See BAYLESS MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW vii

(1964); Bayless Manning, The Purity Potlatch:An Essay on Conflicts of Interest,
American Government, and Moral Escalation,24 FED. B.J. 239, 239-40 (1964).
15. The NYCBA's 1960 Report limited its study to "the conflicts of interest
problem of the executive branch of the federal government." NYCBA 1960
REPORT, supra note 12, at 12. That report, in turn, profoundly influenced the
1962 legislation that revised the federal conflicts of interest statutes (codified as

amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-18). See Hearing on H.R. 8140 to Strengthen the
Criminal Laws Relating to Bribery, Graft, and Conflicts of Interest Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 8 (1962) (statement of Sen. Kenneth
Keating) (observing that "Congress ha[d] been struggling with this subject,
but ... [was] given a great assist in 1960 by the work and report of a special
committee of the [NYCBA]"). Dean Manning's treatise compares the former
conflict-of-interest statutes to Congress's 1962 revisions.
See generally
MANNING, supra note 14.
16. See SPECIAL COMM. ON CONG. ETHICS, AsS'N. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
N.Y., CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST, at x (1970) [hereinafter NYCBA 1970
REPORT]; see also infra text accompanying notes 275-84 (discussing the study's
observations and recommendations).
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Part IV proposes a long overdue solution to the agency problem
associated with the personal investment practices of lawmakers.
Drawing from the fiduciary principles that apply to corporate
directors and government officials in the executive and judicial
branches, it argues for new limitations on the securities that
lawmakers may hold during their congressional service.
Specifically, and as a starting place, it dusts off and advances an
NYCBA recommendation from 1970: that Congress prohibit its
members (and their staffs) from holding securities in companies
substantially affected by the work of any congressional committee
on which they hold membership. But given the ensuing changes in
both legislative activity and stock ownership by lawmakers,
Congress should also explore the adoption of even stricter
anticonflict restraints such as a statute or rule that would, subject
to some narrow exceptions, prohibit members of Congress and senior
staff officials from owning any securities other than government
securities or shares in diversified mutual funds. Although a
provision of this sort was advanced in the Senate and voted down as
an amendment to the STOCK Act, there are very compelling reasons
to try again.
I. CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND THE DuTY OF LOYALTY

A duty of loyalty promotes the main purpose of fiduciary law:
"to prohibit fiduciaries from misappropriating or misusing entrusted
property or power."17 Loyalty requires acting solely for the benefit of
one's entrustor and never for any personal benefit. This sole-benefit
edict is facilitated by a set of rules that prohibits certain actions
outright "even though they are not necessarily injurious" to the
These prophylactic rules serve "to dampen the
entrustor.18
fiduciaries' temptations to misappropriate entrusted property or
power, or to justify benefitting themselves, and establish a
continuous reminder that entrusted property and power do not
belong to the fiduciaries." 19
Rules that guard against self-interested decision making reflect
two essential components of a fiduciary's duty of loyalty: a conflict
component and an avoidance component. 20 The conflict component,
as Professor Kathleen Clark explains, "prohibits a fiduciary from
placing herself in a position where her own interest conflicts with
her duty toward the beneficiary." 21 The avoidance component

FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 108.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Clark, supra note 3, at 71 (drawing from the work of Robert
Flannigan, The FiduciaryObligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285 (1989)).
21. Id.

17.
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"prohibits certain fiduciaries from delegating their duties to others
or putting themselves in a position where, because of conflict or
other concerns, they could not act on behalf of the beneficiary." 22
Like fiduciary law more generally, corporate law has long been
on guard against financial conflicts of interest that could
compromise the duty of loyalty owed to a corporation by those who
manage and direct its business. Indeed, the common law-at least
at one time-allowed a corporation or its shareholders to void an
"interested-director" transaction at will, regardless of the fairness or
unfairness of the transaction. 23 Courts applying this blanket rule of
voidability grounded it in the conflict component of a fiduciary
obligation. As Justice Field observed in Wardell v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co.:24

It is among the rudiments of the law that the same person
cannot act for himself and at the same time, with respect to
the same matter, as the agent of another whose interests are
conflicting.... Directors of corporations, and all persons who
stand in a fiduciary relation to other parties, and are clothed
with power to act for them, are subject to this rule; they are
not permitted to occupy a position which will conflict with the
interest of parties they represent and are bound to protect.
They cannot, as agents or trustees, enter into or authorize
contracts on behalf of those for whom they are appointed to
act, and then personally participate in the benefits. 25
Courts presented with financial conflicts that could taint
director decision making were willing to presume harm to the
corporation, even without any evidence to that effect, for a number
of reasons. First, courts were highly skeptical that interested
directors possessed the wherewithal to separate their own financial
well-being from their corporate decision making. Moreover, courts
assumed that in "a conflict between interest and duty . . . 'in the

majority of cases duty would be overborne in the struggle."'2 6 Courts
were also concerned about structural bias in the corporate
boardroom-the very likely possibility that one or more directors
with a conflict could exert subtle pressure on fellow directors. In
this regard, courts questioned the ability of law "to accurately
measure the influence of a trustee with his associates."27

22. Id.
23. See generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW

§ 5.1 (1986);

Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 36 (1966).

24. 103 U.S. 651 (1880).
25. Id. at 658.
26. Id. (quoting Marsh v. Whitmore, 88 U.S. 178, 183-84 (1874)).
27. Munson v. Syracuse, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (N.Y. 1886).
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Corporate law, however, rather quickly evolved to recognize the
validity of interested-director transactions under certain sets of
circumstances. The evolution began with courts placing a legal
burden on the interested director to prove both that the transaction
was entirely fair to the corporation (despite the presence of the
conflict) and that the transaction had been approved by a fully
informed and disinterested majority of board members. 28 This
judicial development was fueled by practicality more than anything
else. 29 Interested-director transactions were sometimes beneficial to
the corporation, such as in instances where directors were willing to
provide loans to corporations with dubious records of credit. 30 And
certain interested-director transactions, such as compensation
decisions for board members and officers, are impossible to avoid
entirely.3 1 The evolution continued when courts allowed directors to
defend against breach of loyalty claims through a showing that an
interested-director transaction was entirely fair to the corporation
whether or not that transaction had been approved by a
disinterested majority of the board. 32
Today, statutory provisions in the corporate law of every state
have built on these judicial developments by specifying alternative
mechanisms pursuant to which an interested-director transaction
can be "sanitized."
Section 144(a) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 33 for example, specifies three distinct ways by
which an interested-director transaction can survive a litigation
challenge: (1) approval in good faith, after full disclosure, by a
majority of disinterested directors; (2) approval in good faith, after
full disclosure, by a majority of disinterested shareholders; or (3)
proof that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation. 34 The
Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") has similar provisions on
"Directors' Conflicting Interest Transactions." 35 Thus, under these
28. See CLARK, supranote 23, at 160.
29. See STEPHEN A. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMIcs 308
(2002) (emphasizing practicality, but also recognizing that a per se rule of
voidability "fails to give due deference to the principles of party autonomy and
freedom of contract, which are important values both in themselves and
because they promote efficient transactions").
30. See CLARK, supranote 23, at 185.
31. Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 909 (2011).
32. Marsh, supra note 23, at 43-44 (observing that from 1910 to 1960,
there were a large number of cases which dealt with situations "where a
majority of the board w[as] interested and which discuss them solely in terms of
a review of the fairness of the transaction, without bothering to cite or discuss
any of the previous decisions . . . enunciating the rule that there must be
approval by a disinterested majority of the board").
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2011).
34. Id. § 144(a)(1)-(3).
35. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-.63 (2005).

2013]

OWNING STOCK WHILE MAKING LAW

575

statutory provisions, interested-director transactions can be valid
and enforceable as long as they are either approved or fair. But
because proving "entire fairness" to a court is both time consuming
and expensive, boards typically take advance steps to ensure that
interested directors make full disclosure about their conflicts and
then recuse themselves from any decision to approve the
transaction. 36
What is most important, given this Article's focus on
lawmakers, is that in Delaware and every other state, interesteddirector transactions stand out as a fundamental exception to the
business judgment rule that would otherwise apply to decisions
made by corporate boards. The business judgment rule reflects a
basic presumption that when directors make a decision, they do so
"on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the
action was taken in the best interests of the corporation." 37 The rule
thus serves to insulate most board decisions from litigation
challenges by shareholders as well as second-guessing by courts.
However, courts will not apply the business judgment rule-that is,
courts will not automatically presume good faith and loyal decision
making on the part of directors-if shareholders can offer evidence
that one or more board members stood to gain personally from a
corporate transaction. 38
Because courts will not presume that directors will necessarily
resolve all conflicts in accordance with the corporation's best
interests, interested-director transactions trigger the need for
judicial review. When such a transaction has been approved by a
majority of disinterested directors or shareholders, the extent of
judicial scrutiny is minimal. 39 The scrutiny centers on the nature of
the process for approval, with the central focus on whether all
relevant facts pertaining to the conflict were fully disclosed and
whether the directors (or shareholders) who approved the
transaction were in fact disinterested and acting in good faith. 40 If a
court determines that the processes for director approval or
shareholder approval were satisfactory, the protection of the
business judgment rule is effectively restored, and litigation will
typically be dismissed unless another reason, independent of the

36. See generally Hill & McDonnell, supra note 31.
37. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
38. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("When
directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith . . .
39. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 31, at 914.
40. Id. at 913-14.
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conflict, exists for challenging the transaction. 4 1 In contrast,
interested-director transactions that have not been sanitized by
disinterested decision makers trigger a much higher degree of
judicial scrutiny. Under the "entire fairness" test, courts will insist
that the defendants bear the burden of proving that the challenged
transaction was concluded at a fair price and involved fair dealing.42
Fair dealing "embraces questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained."4 3 A director's failure to disclose a
conflict of interest is generally regarded as compelling evidence of
unfair dealing. 44
Whether judicial scrutiny is minimal pursuant to a processbased safe harbor or rigorous under an entire fairness test, modern
corporate law continues to view the possibility of personal gain from
corporate transactions with suspicion. To be sure, the common law
rule of automatic voidability has been replaced with statutory
provisions that are far more tolerant of conflicts. But Delaware
section 144 and the like simply reflect a legislative judgment that a
corporation's disinterested directors or shareholders, after full
disclosure of a conflict, constitute effective "reviewers." 45 The need
for impartial review in conflict-of-interest situations has never been
questioned. Nor has there been a retreat from the loyalty-based rule
that corporate directors must act solely for the benefit of the
corporation and not for their own personal benefit.
II. FINANCIAL CONFLICTS AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS OUTSIDE OF
CONGRESS

The design and structure of our federal government draws from
the very same fiduciary principles that underlie corporate law.
Federal officials-whether elected or appointed-are entrusted with
political power, and they are thus expected to place the public's best
interest ahead of their own self-interest. Indeed, as others have

41. See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del.
2006) (stating that "[a]fter approval by disinterested directors, courts review
the interested transaction under the business judgment rule").
42. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
43. Id.
44. See generally MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.60, cmt. 6(b) (2005) (observing
that "[o]ne illustration of unfair dealing is the director's failure to disclose fully
the director's interest . .. regarding the transaction"); see also HMG/Courtland
Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 116 (Del. Ch. 1999) (ruling that process was
"anything but fair" when one director knew of another director's interest in the
transaction, but neither disclosed that interest to their fellow directors).
45. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 31, at 921.
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emphasized,46 the U.S. Constitution refers in multiple places to
"public Trust"4 7 and to public offices being "of Trust."4 8 The
Constitution also includes several provisions expressly designed to
guard against self-interested decision making. 49
Anticonflict
measures were much on the minds of the framers because, as James
Madison explained in The Federalist:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and
most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in
the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for
keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their
public trust.5 0
Congress built on this constitutional conception of a public office
as a public trust across a wide range of federal ethics statutes,
which employ a variety of mechanisms for keeping government
officials "virtuous" (thereby, in corporate parlance, mitigating
agency costs). Criminal anticorruption statutes, such as those that
prohibit the receipt of bribes5 1 and illegal gratuities, 52 are obvious
examples. 53 Other criminal statutes, often described generally as
"conflicts of interest statutes," 54 regulate such matters as a federal
official's acceptance of gifts5 5 or the receipt of outside earned
income, 56 or they prohibit the representation of third parties before

46.

FRANKEL, supra note 3,

1086).
47.

U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3.

at 282 (quoting Natelson, supra note 3, at

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
49. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or
48.

Trust under [the United States] shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
accept any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any
King, Prince, or foreign State."); id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (prohibiting members of
Congress from being appointed to a federal office that was created or that
received an increase in salary during their time in Congress); id. amend. XXVII
(prohibiting a member of Congress from receiving an increase in salary until
after he/she stands for reelection); see also Daniel L. Koffsky, Coming to Terms
with Bureaucratic Ethics, 11 J. L. & POL. 235, 238-43 (1995) (discussing
conflict-of-interest restrictions in the Constitution).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 327 (James Madison).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(a) (2006) (making it a crime for both the offeror
and the public official to corruptly engage in a transfer of anything of value
with the intent to influence any official act).
52. Id. § 201(c) (making it a crime to provide (or accept) a gratuity "for or
because of' the official's performance of an official act "otherwise than as
provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty").
53. For others, see generally PETER J. HENNING & LEE J. RADEK, THE
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION (2011).

54.
55.
56.

See NYCBA 1960 REPORT, supra note 12, at ch. III.
5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 209.
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government agencies.6 7 Financial reporting statutes, which have
their origins in the fiduciary obligation of disclosure, constitute
another important example. 58
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 ("EIGA")59 provides the
statutory basis for the financial reporting duties of federal officials
in all three branches of the government. Designed in large part to
reveal and deter financial conflicts of interest, the EIGA requires
hundreds of thousands of federal officials to file annual statements
that disclose their income (other than earned income from U.S.
government employment), financial holdings (asset values may be
specified in certain dollar ranges in lieu of exact amounts), gifts,
travel reimbursements, liabilities, and business affiliations. 6 0
Although low-level government employees are generally entitled to
file their disclosure forms confidentially, the public has access (by
request) to the financial disclosure statements submitted by
thousands of other "public filers." 61
Recent STOCK Act
amendments to the EIGA promote even greater transparency and
accountability by requiring the President, Vice President, any
member of Congress, any candidate for Congress, and certain
presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed executive branch
officials to promptly supplement their annual forms by reporting
most new financial transactions over $1,000 no later than forty-five
days after the purchase or sale (diversified mutual fund transactions
are not covered).6 2 These reports shall be made available to the
public on official House and Senate websites for the legislative
branch and on the Office of Government Ethics website for the

57. Id. § 203.
58. See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat.
1824 (codified as amended in scattered §§ of 2, 5, 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
59. Id.
60. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-02.

61. See Kathleen Clark, Ethics, Employees and Contractors: Financial
Conflicts of Interest in and out of Government, 62 ALA. L. REV. 961, 970 (2011)
(observing that each year, the executive branch alone has approximately 25,000
employees who submit public disclosure forms and 300,000 additional
employees who submit confidential disclosure forms). In addition to members of
Congress, "public filers" in the legislative branch include "senior staff," a term
used to denote an officer or employee whose annual base salary exceeds a
specified level. See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42495, THE STOCK
ACT, INSIDER TRADING, AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL REPORTING BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS

3 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42495.pdf. Officers and
employees earning an annual salary of approximately $120,000 or above were
considered senior staff when the STOCK Act became law. See 158 CONG. REC.
S243 (Feb. 1, 2012) (statement by Sen. Sherrod Brown).
62. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 6(a), 126 Stat. 291, 293-94 (2012)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 103).
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executive branch. 63 Although their financial transaction reports will
not be available online, all other public filers in the legislative and
executive branches under the EIGA are required to adhere to the
STOCK Act's provisions for prompt reporting of personal financial
transactions. 64
In addition to the EIGA's disclosure requirements, federal
officials in the executive and judicial branches are governed by a
strict statutory framework that expressly prohibits these officials
from participating or rendering decisions in matters that affect their
own financial interests.6 5 Financial disclosure requirements thus
facilitate the investigation and enforcement of financial conflict-ofinterest laws. But, as we shall see in Part III, legislative branch
officials generally function free from explicit, financial conflict-ofinterest restraints.6 6 Instead, Congress presumes that a lawmaker
is generally able to decide for him or herself what the duty of loyalty
requires. Public financial disclosures under the EIGA and electoral
accountability are thus the principal means of monitoring and
deterring financial conflicts of interest on the part of lawmakers and
most congressional employees.
A.

Executive Branch Officials
Financial conflicts of interest that could possibly bias an
executive branch official's decision making are addressed most
directly in 18 U.S.C. § 208, a broadly worded statute entitled "Acts
Affecting a Personal Financial Interest." Its basic precept, in the
words of the NYCBA's 1960 Report, is that a public official "should
not act for the government where his private economic interests are
involved."6 7 Section 208 subjects to imprisonment or other penalties
any "officer or employee of the Executive branch of the United
States Government, or of any independent agency of the United
States" who
participates personally and substantially as a Government
officer or employee, through decision, approval, disapproval,
recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or
63. Id. §§ 8(b), 11(b). But see Pub. L. No. 113-7, § 1, 127 Stat. 438, 438-39

(2013) (adjusting the STOCK Act's online availability date to January 14, 2014
and rescinding the previous requirement that these databases be maintained in
a manner allowing the public to "search, sort and download data contained in
the reports").
64. § 6(a), 126 Stat. at 293; § 1(a), 127 Stat. at 438 (permanently rescinding
the STOCK Act's previous requirement for Internet posting of transaction
reports for most public filers in the legislative and executive branches of the
government).
65. See infra Subparts II.A, II.B.
66. See infra Part III.
67. See NYCBA 1960 REPORT, supra note 12, at 198.
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otherwise, in a judicial or other proceeding, application,
request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim,
controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular
matter in which, to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child,
general partner, organization in which he is serving as officer,
director, trustee, general partner or employee, or any person or
organization with whom he is negotiating or has any
arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a
financial interest . . . .68
Although there is some disagreement as to whether the Constitution
allows § 208's prohibition to reach the President and Vice President,
government ethics scholars observe that the issue is not likely to be
tested, "because presidents and vice presidents already
conscientiously seek to comply with the conflicts of interest statutes
regardless of whether the statutes apply."6 9
By criminalizing the mere possibility of actions involving
divided loyalty on the part of executive branch officials, Congress
ensured that these decision makers would take seriously the conflict
component of their fiduciary obligation. 70 Officials in the executive
branch have two clear alternatives: either recuse or divest whenever
one's participation in a "particular matter" could implicate one's own
financial self-interest, unless an exemption is available.7 1 As the
Supreme Court emphasized in United States v. Mississippi Valley
GeneratingCo. 72:
The statute is directed at an evil which endangers the very

fabric of a democratic society, for a democracy is effective only
if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is
bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees
engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance
and corruption. The seriousness of this evil quite naturally led

68. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2006).
69. See PAINTER, supra note 3, at 59-61.

70. See supra text accompanying note 21.
71. Section 208 contains four principal exemptions: (1) if the official makes
full disclosure of the financial interest and seeks an advance waiver from the
agency head, who determines that the "interest is not so substantial as to be
deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services which the Government may
expect from such officer or employee;" (2) if the Office of Government Ethics has
issued a regulation exempting the financial interest from the statute's
application because it is "too remote or too inconsequential" to affect the
integrity of government services; (3) if the official is serving in a temporary
position on a federal advisory committee and a senior official opts to waive the
conflict based on the need for that official's services; (4) if the financial interest
involves a claim of a Native American birthright. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b).
72. 364 U.S. 520 (1961).

2013]

OWNING STOCK WHILE MAKING LAW

581

Congress to adopt a statute whose breadth would be sufficient
to cope with the evil. 73
Because it is aimed at executive branch decisions that simply
"arouse suspicion," § 208 employs an objective standard for liability
and requires no showing of actual corruption or bad faith intent.
Courts have held that the statute's "to his knowledge" modifier
applies only to the official's "financial interest" and not to the crime
itself.74 Thus, as long as an executive branch official is aware of a
financial holding covered by the statute, even an official's good faith
participation in an agency matter can be subject to criminal
prosecution.7 5 Chief Justice Earl Warren highlighted this objective
standard when he observed that the statute is "directed not only at
dishonor, but also at conduct that tempts dishonor.... [It] is more
concerned with what might have happened in a given situation than
with what actually happened." 76
Congress directed the U.S. Office of Government Ethics ("OGE")
to interpret the statute and promulgate certain exemptions in
executive branch-wide regulations.7 7 Pursuant to that authority,
the OGE has construed the term "particular matter" to include
"[any] judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling
or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation,
charge, accusation or arrest" as well as "matters which do not
involve formal parties . . . [such as] legislation or policy making that

is narrowly focused on the interests of a discrete and identifiable
class of persons." 78 Thus, a particular matter could include a
Department of Agriculture regulation directed at companies that
operate meat packing plants,79 or a prescription drug regulation by
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") applicable to
pharmaceutical companies.8 0 But it would not include Department
of Labor changes to health and safety regulations pertaining to all

73. Id. at 562 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 434, the financial conflict statute
that was the statutory predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 208); accord United States v.
Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1304 n.1 (6th Cir. 1986) (observing that Mississippi
Valley "remains applicable" because "the purpose of Section 208 is to strengthen
its predecessor without changing any of its underlying policies") (internal
quotes omitted).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1990).

75. See David R. Flickinger, Attracting the Best and the Brightest to
Government Service: Requiring Scienter for Criminal Conflicts of Interest, 25
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 519, 520 (2012) (acknowledging the objective standard of
liability under prevailing precedents, but arguing that courts should instead
impose a requirement of criminal intent).
76. Miss. Valley, 364 U.S. at 549-50.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 208(d)(2).

78. 5 C.F.R. § 2640.103(a)(1) (2012).
79. Id. ex. 3.
80. Id. ex. 8.
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U.S. employers, because such a change would affect virtually every
publicly traded corporation in the nation, and thus it would be
directed "to the interests of a large and diverse group of persons." 81
The OGE has also clarified that the statutory proscription
applies only if the particular matter would have a "direct and
predictable effect" on the participating employee's financial
interest.82 "Direct" is defined as "a close causal link between any
decision or action to be taken in the matter and any expected effect
of the matter on the financial interest" 8 3 and "predictable" is defined
as "a real, as opposed to a speculative, possibility that the matter
will affect the financial interest."84 The regulations specifically
contemplate that a "disqualifying financial interest might arise from
ownership of certain financial instruments or investments, such as
stock, bonds, mutual funds, or real estate."8 5 Certain securities held
in qualified blind trusts, however, are not considered "financial
interests." 86 The OGE has also exempted holdings in diversified
mutual funds and employee benefit plans as well as certain de
minimis interests in publicly traded securities provided the market
value of all personal holdings in the securities issuer does not exceed
$15,000.87
The following scenario, included in OGE regulations, is
illustrative of § 208's broad scope:
An employee is assigned to monitor XYZ Corporation's
performance of a contract to provide computer maintenance
services at the employee's agency. At the time the employee is
first assigned these duties, he owns publicly traded stock in
XYZ Corporation valued at less than $15,000. During the time
the contract is being performed, however, the value of the
employee's stock increases to $17,500. When the employee
knows that the value of his stock exceeds $15,000, he must
disqualify himself from any further participation in matters
affecting XYZ Corporation or seek an individual waiver under
18 U.S.C. 208(b)(1). Alternatively, the employee may divest
the portion of his XYZ stock that exceeds $15,000. This can be
accomplished through a standing order with his broker to sell
when the value of the stock exceeds $15,000.88

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
the default

ex. 4.
§ 2640.103(a)(3).
§ 2640.103(a)(3)(i).
§ 2640.103(a)(3)(ii).
§ 2640.103(b).
§ 2634.401(a).
§ 2640.201. The OGE's de minimis exception, however, serves as
rule. Individual agencies may enact regulations specifying lower

thresholds for its employees or eliminating the exception entirely.
88. Id. § 2640.202(a) ex. 3.
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The example demonstrates that § 208 criminalizes the employee's
participation in an XYZ matter even if his $2,500 in stock holdings
above the de minimis amount was exceedingly unlikely to influence
his monitoring of XYZ's computer services contract. When a
violation of § 208 is discovered (whether through a supervisor's
review of an official's financial disclosure filings or otherwise), the
agency that employs that official will typically coordinate with its
office of Inspector General to ensure that the matter is referred to
the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice, which
ultimately determines whether a prosecution is warranted. 89
Congress has likewise enacted legislation that reflects the
avoidance component of an executive branch official's fiduciary
obligation.9 0 Although there is not a single government-wide statute
that requires an executive branch official to divest financial
interests in circumstances where a § 208-prompted recusal would
her
government
with his
or
fundamentally
interfere
responsibilities, 9 1 there is a host of agency-specific statutes that
prohibit officials from holding financial interests in certain entities.
For example, the first Congress prohibited the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Treasurer from investing in securities issued by
the federal government or the states. 92 Statutory prohibitions may
also apply agency wide: Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") employees, for instance, are prohibited from holding
financial interests in any company engaged in radio or wire
communication. 93 Particular congressional committees, often as a
condition of Senate confirmation, may likewise restrict the financial
holdings of certain executive branch officials. The Senate Armed
Services Committee, for instance, prohibits presidential appointees
to positions in the Department of Defense ("DOD") from owning
stocks or bonds in the nearly 50,000 companies that have contracts
with the Pentagon. 94 Notably, Congress has amended the tax code
to allow for the deferral of capital gains tax when a federal official
sells assets to avoid conflicts of interest. 95
The avoidance component of an executive branch official's
fiduciary obligation is further reflected in certain agency-specific

89. See Enforcement, U.S. OFF. Gov'T ETHICS, http://www.oge.gov/Topics
/Enforcement/Enforcement/ (last visited July 16, 2013).
90. See Clark, supranote 3, at 90.
91. See id.
92.

See Donna M. Nagy & Richard W. Painter, Selective Disclosure by

Federal Officials and the Case for an FGD (Fairer Government Disclosure)
Regime, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 1285, 1297-98 & n.56 (discussing the insider trading
scandal that prompted this statutory prohibition).
93. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
94. See Higham et al., supranote 5.
95. See PAINTER, supra note 3, at 42.
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regulations. That is, individual agencies have broad authority to
issue regulations prohibiting all or some employees from specific
categories of financial investments "based on the agency's
determination that the acquisition or holding of such financial
interest would cause a reasonable person to question the
impartiality and objectivity with which agency programs are
administered."9 6 The FDA, for example, prohibits most of its
employees from holding any financial interest in a "significantly
regulated organization." 97 Moreover, agencies may prohibit an
individual employee from holding or acquiring financial interests
that will "[r]equire the employee's disqualification from matters so
central or critical to the performance of his official duties that the
employee's ability to perform the duties of his position would be
materially impaired,"9 8 or "adversely affect the efficient
accomplishment of the agency's mission because another employee
cannot be readily assigned." 99
Whether the "interest avoidance" is imposed by federal statute
or by an administrative regulation, and whether it applies to a
particular person or to persons across an entire agency, its objective
is the same: to eliminate financial interests that could possibly
tempt an executive branch official into subordinating the public
interest to his or her own self-interest.1 00 Consistent with the
fiduciary principle, the protection of the integrity of government
decision making is paramount. 101
JudicialBranch Officials
The primary judicial recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, embodies
the conflict component of a fiduciary obligation. Pursuant to this
statute, any U.S. justice, judge, or magistrate judge is required to
disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which his or her
"impartiality might be reasonably questioned." 10 2 The statute
further mandates recusal in any one of five specific circumstances.
These circumstances include a judge's financial interest, when such
an official

B.

96. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.403(a) (2012).
97. Id. § 5501.104. An organization is "significantly regulated" if the sales
of products regulated by the FDA would "constitute ten percent or more of
annual gross sales in the organization's previous fiscal year." Id. §
5501.104(c)(2).
98. Id. § 2635.403(b)(1).
99. Id. § 2635.403(b)(2).
100. See NYCBA 1970 REPORT, supranote 16, at 40-41.
101. Id. at 41.

102. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006).

See generally Charles Gardner Geyh,

Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law, FED. JUD. CENTER,
(last
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup/judicialdq.pdfl$file/judicialdq.pdf
visited Sept. 4, 2013).
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knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding. 103
"Financial interest" is defined broadly to mean "ownership of a
legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as
director, advisor or other active participant in the affairs of a
party."104 But the term specifically excludes "[o]wnership in a
mutual or common investment fund that holds securities ... unless
the judge participates in the management of the fund"10 5 as well as
"[o]wnership of government securities ...

[unless] the outcome of

the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
securities."10 6 The statute also makes clear that judges have a duty
to inform themselves about their personal financial interests and
the financial interests of their spouses and minor children residing
in their household.107
The judicial recusal statute's reference to financial ownership
interests "however small" forecloses any de minimis exception.
State court judges typically operate under judicial codes that define
financial interests to mean "more than a de minimis interest,"10 8 and
as we have seen, OGE regulations include de minimis exceptions in
connection with publicly traded securities held by officials in the
executive branch. 109 But § 455 imposes "a bright line rule [that]
requires recusal based on ownership of even a single share of stock
in a party"110 or in a company substantially affected by the subject
It also states explicitly that a judge's
matter in controversy."
disqualification for a financial interest is not subject to waiver by
the parties. 112
Section 455 does, however, provide a limited mechanism by
which judges may divest themselves of certain financial interests
that would otherwise disqualify them from presiding over a
proceeding. The relevant provision specifies that
[n]otwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if
any justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to
103. 8 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006).
104. Id. § 455(d)(4).
105. Id. § 455(d)(4)(i).
106. Id. § 455(d)(4)(iv).
107. Id. § 455(c).
108. M. Margaret McKeown, To Judge or Not to Judge: Transparencyand
Recusal in the Federal System, 30 REV. LITIG. 653, 662-63 (2011).
109. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
110. McKeown, supra note 108, at 662-63 n.57.

111. Id.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (2006).
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whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after
substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter,
because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was
assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a
fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or
her household, has a financial interest in a party (other than
an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice, judge,
magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as
the case may be, divests himself or himself of the interest that
provides the grounds for the disqualification. 113
Thus, a judge may avert the need for recusal-through divestitureif she does not discover the financial interest until after she has
devoted significant time to the matter and if the financial interest at
issue could not be substantially affected by the matter's outcome.
Congress enacted § 455 to ensure that judges assess for
themselves whether a conflict of interest requires them to decline an
assignment or to recuse themselves from a case that has already
been assigned. 114 The judiciary has also implemented institutional
safeguards to avoid financial conflicts, such as the random drawing
of assignments as well as an electronic conflicts screening system
that flags a judge's previously reported financial interests that could
trigger the need for disqualification. 115 But in the absence of a
judge's voluntary withdrawal, § 455 permits parties to move for
recusal. Moreover, judges who fail to recuse themselves when
circumstances warrant may be subject to a judicial conduct
complaint initiated by a litigant, a member of the public, or the chief
judge of the circuit. 116 In particularly egregious cases, judges could
be impeached.1 17

113. Id. § 455(f). Notably, § 455(c)'s due diligence requirement for personal
and family member investments, see supra text accompanying note 107,
substantially reduces the likelihood of a "discovery" that would trigger this
divestiture alternative.

114. McKeown, supra note 108, at 664.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 665 (citing Judicial Conduct & Disability Act: Resources,
U.S.
CTs.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ConductAndDisability
/JudicialConductDisability.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (giving the codes

of conduct in each circuit)). The disqualification requirements set out in
28 U.S.C. § 455 are transcribed virtually verbatim into Canon 3C of the Code
of Conduct for U.S. Judges.
See Guide to Judiciary Policy, U.S. CTs.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/conductNol02A-Ch2.pdf.
117. See Geyh, supra note 102, at 27 (observing that Judge G. Thomas
Porteous, Jr. from the Eastern District of Louisiana was impeached, found
guilty by the Senate, and removed from office in 2010 based on his refusal to
disqualify himself from hearing a case in which a party was represented by a
lawyer from whom he had recently solicited-and years before received-money
to pay personal gambling and other debts).
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III. FINANCIAL CONFLICTS AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Like corporate directors and federal officials in the executive
and judicial branches, members of Congress and their staffs serve as
agents with fiduciary obligations to their principals. But while few
would dispute that congressional officials owe a duty of loyalty to
the federal government and the public, the prophylactic rules that
guard against financial conflicts in corporations and in the other two
branches of government have been regarded as unwarranted in the
legislative branch. After addressing the principal rationales offered
by lawmakers in defense of the status quo and examining some facts
about lawmakers as stock market investors, this Part draws a very
different conclusion.
A.

Lawmakers as Fiduciaries
In both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, rules
and other official pronouncements proudly decree that a "public
office is a public trust."118 But as Jack Maskell emphasized in
congressional hearings on the STOCK Act, this phrase is "more than
merely an aphorism, because it denotes that Members of Congress
who wield public power have a fiduciary responsibility to use that
power in the interests of the general public who are supposed to be
the beneficiaries of that trust."119 The STOCK Act itself was
premised on an existing fiduciary obligation of loyalty, 120 and that
premise is now embodied in the Act's explicit dictate that all federal
officials, including members of Congress, owe a duty "arising from a
relationship of trust and confidence" to the federal government and
its citizens with respect to material, nonpublic information obtained
in connection with their government service. 121 Congressional

118.

Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong.

T 10 (1958); STAFF OF S. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 108TH CONG., SENATE ETHICS
MANUAL at 11, 21, 184, 436 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter SENATE ETHICS
MANUAL], available at http://ethics.senate.gov/downloads/pdffiles/manual.pdf;
H. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH CONG., HOUSE ETHICS
MANUAL 2, 23, 151, 187, 215, 355 (2008) [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL],
available at http://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/documents/2008
HouseEthicsManual.pdf.
119. The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act: Hearing on H.R
1148 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 83-84 (2011) [hereinafter
House STOCK Act Hearing] (written statement by Jack Maskell, Legislative
Attorney, American Law Division, Congressional Research Service).
120. See 158 CONG. REc. S1977-78 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of
Sen. Susan Collins) (describing "the affirmation of a duty arising from the
relationship of trust and confidence" as the "heart" of the Act, and emphasizing
that "this is not a new fiduciary duty, in the traditional sense, but the
recognition of an existing duty").
121. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4(b), 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g)-(h)).
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fiduciary obligations also have a strong constitutional underpinning,
as we have already seen.122
The fiduciary duty of members of Congress toward the public
manifests itself in a host of other federal statutes apart from the
STOCK Act's insider trading provisions and the EIGA's financial
reporting requirements.1 23 Some of these statutes, such as the
conflict-of-interest statutes and the anticorruption statutes
discussed previously, are tailored specifically toward conduct by
lawmakers as a specific class or as part of a broader class of public
officials.124 Congress, for example, subjects its members and
employees to strict statutory limitations on the gifts that they can
receive, the honoraria that they can be paid for speaking
engagements, and the work-related contacts they may have with
their former colleagues in the two-year period following their
departure from service in Congress.125 Other federal statutes have
broader application but can be used by prosecutors to charge official
misconduct, such as the mail fraud 26 and wire fraud statutes,127
which can encompass congressional breaches of loyalty in cases
involving bribes and kickbacks (often referred to as "honest services
fraud")128 as well as the misappropriation of property. 129

122. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. See also Natelson,
supra note 3, at 1083-84 (observing that at the time of the federal
constitutional convention, "most of the state constitutions already contained
fiduciary language" and that during the public debate over the Constitution,
"leading proponents of the new government repeatedly characterized officials as
the people's servants, agents, guardians, or trustees"); Rave, supra note 3, at
708-13 (discussing constitutional history and political theory).
123. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
125. See PAINTER, supra note 3, at 146-52.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (prohibiting "schemes or artifices to defraud"
through use of the mails).
127. Id. § 1343 (prohibiting "schemes or artifices to defraud" through use of
electronic wires, radio, or television).

128. See Restoring Key Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption After the
Supreme Court's Skilling Decision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33 (2010) (written statement by Lanny A. Breuer,

Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (stating
that for decades, federal prosecutors have used the mail and wire fraud statutes
to reach "schemes designed to deprive citizens of the honest services of public
and private officials who owe them a fiduciary duty of loyalty"); see also Donna

M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment,
91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1145-50 (2011) (discussing honest service fraud
prosecutions involving several former Members of Congress, including
Representatives William Jefferson, Randy Cunningham, Richard Renzi, and
Robert Ney).
129. See Nagy, supra note 128, at 1149-50 (discussing mail fraud
convictions involving former Representatives Charles Diggs and Dan
Rostenkowski).
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In addition to federal statutes, the fiduciary duty of lawmakers
to the public is reflected in ethics rules adopted and enforced by the
Senate and the House Ethics Committee, respectively, and in the
commentary set out in each chamber's Ethics Manual.1 30 As the
Constitution provides, congressional self discipline for "disorderly
behavior" is administered by the member's own chamber. 131 And as
the Supreme Court recognized in In re Chapman,132 even the right
to expel "extends to all cases where the offense is such as in the
judgment of the [chamber] is inconsistent with the trust and duty of
a member."133
Congress's own perception of lawmakers as fiduciaries is shared
by federal courts, including the Supreme Court, as the above
quotation from Chapman reflects. The Court implicitly avowed a
congressional duty of loyalty in Skilling v. United Statesl34 when it
observed that "[tihe existence of a fiduciary relationship . . . was

beyond dispute" in several prior precedents, including a D.C. Circuit
decision that had affirmed a former congressman's conviction for
mail fraud. 135 In United States v. Diggs,136 the court stated
explicitly that the congressman's conduct "amounted to no less than
a scheme to take illicit kick-backs" and that this scheme "defrauded
the public of not only substantial sums of money but of his faithful
and honest services."1 37 The Second Circuit also applied a fiduciary
theory in United States v. Podell,138 a decision which affirmed a
grant of summary judgment to the government for "monies [the
defendant] had received in breach of his fiduciary duty as a United

130. See also HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 118; see SENATE ETHICS
MANUAL, supra note 118.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing that "Each House may determine
the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and
with the Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.").
132. 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
133. Id. at 669-70; see Nagy, supra note 128, at 1143 (observing that while
Congress is often criticized for its reluctance to self-discipline its memberswith the reluctance extending to even relatively mild sanctions involving
denouncement or reprimand-there is no doubt that each chamber "has the
authority to proscribe and sanction betrayals of the public trust"); see also
Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Self-Regulation of Congressional Ethics: Substance
and Structure, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 39, 46 (1996) (observing that at least one
senator has been censured for actions "derogat[ing] from the public trust
expected of a senator" even though the conduct at issue had not violated "any
specific law or rule in force at the time").
134. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
135. Id. at 2929-30 (citing United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 998 (D.C.
Cir. 1979)).
136. 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
137. Id. at 998.
138. 572 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978).
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States Congressman."1 39 Relying on equitable principles rather
than on an express statutory remedy for his violation of a conflict-ofinterest statute, the court regarded the congressman's receipt of
compensation and campaign contributions-for his appearances
before several federal agencies on behalf of an airline-as ill-gotten
gains that he held "in constructive trust for the government." 140
Yet when we turn to the federal statutes and ethics rules that
govern members and employees of Congress and we shift our focus
specifically to financial conflicts of interest arising from personal
investments, the fiduciary dictates that we would expect to see are
nowhere to be found. Instead, except in the limited circumstances of
earmarks, 141 we mainly find commentary in ethics manuals setting
forth rationalizations for the absence of such dictates. 142 The dearth
of ethics rules regulating personal investments (not to mention the
total absence of a judicially enforceable statute) is particularly
striking when compared to the strict financial conflict-of-interest
restraints that Congress has placed on executive and judicial branch
officials and the heightened scrutiny that state corporate law
accords to interested-director transactions. Although limitations on
the type of securities that lawmakers can own may discourage some
persons from pursuing or continuing with congressional service,
others may be even more drawn to serve in an institution that
commits itself to higher standards of ethics and fiduciary principles.
B. CongressionalRules and Rationales Relating to Financial
Conflicts
1. The Senate
Rule 37, paragraph 4 of the Senate Code of Official Conduct is
the ethical provision that is said to prohibit senators from using
their legislative power to advance their own personal financial
interests. It states that
[n]o Member, officer, or employee shall knowingly use his
official position to introduce or aid the progress or passage of
legislation, a principal purpose of which is to further only his
pecuniary interest, only the pecuniary interest of his
139. Id. at 32.
140. Id. at 34-35. The court observed that the congressman previously had
pleaded guilty to charges involving conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 203 as well
as a substantive violation of that conflict-of-interest statute and had been
sentenced to two years in prison, eighteen months of which had been
suspended, for the conspiracy count and fined $5,000 on the conflict-of-interest
count. Id. at 34. For additional analysis of the Podell decision, see House STOCK

Act Hearing,supra note 119, at 57 (testimony by Jack Maskell).
141. See infra Subpart III.B.3.
142. SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 118, at 69.

2013]

OWNING STOCK WHILE MAKING LAW

591

immediate family, or only the pecuniary interest of a limited
class of persons or enterprises, when he, or his immediate
family, or enterprises controlled by them, are members of the
affected class. 143
The Senate Ethics Manual, which is published by the Senate Select
Committee on Ethics (the "Ethics Committee"), expressly describes
Rule 37(4)'s scope as "narrow."144 It also candidly acknowledges that
"[l]egislation may have a significant financial effect on a senator
because his holdings are involved." 145 But as long as that legislation
"has a broad, general impact on his state or the nation," Rule 37(4)
would not prevent a senator from voting on the legislation or from
playing an active role in advancing or blocking its passage. 146
The plain language of Rule 37(4)'s prohibition, which turns in
large part on the lawmaker's motive, reveals why the rule is actually
more akin to an anticorruption rule than an anticonflicts rule. To
violate Rule 37(4), a senator would not only have to "know" that the
legislation in question would advance his (or an immediate family
member's) "pecuniary interest," but his action to "introduce or aid
the process or passage" of that legislation also must have had as its
"principal purpose" the furthering of "only" his or his family's
pecuniary interest or "only" the pecuniary interests of a "limited
class" in which he is a member. If his actions were intended to
further several interests of equivalent importance, only one of which
was self-serving, then the rule's "principal purpose" prong would not
be met.
Rule 37(4) dates back to 1977, a few years after Watergate,
when the Senate amended its Standing Rules to include a Code of
Official Conduct. Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) chaired the
special committee (now referred to as the "Nelson Committee") that
proposed the code. To illustrate the restrictive scope of this new
prohibition, the Nelson Committee included in its report an example
involving a dairy farmer from a state with dairy as a leading
industry.147 In the Nelson Committee's view, this senator could

143. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 110TH CONG., SENATE CODE OF OFFICIAL
CONDUCT 16 (Comm. Print 2008). Senate Rule 37(1) provides more generally

that "[a] Member, officer, or employee of the Senate shall not receive any
compensation, nor shall he permit any compensation to accrue to his beneficial
interest from any source, the receipt or accrual of which would occur by virtue
of influence improperly exerted from his position as a Member, Officer, or
employee." Id.
144. SENATE ETHICs MANUAL, supra note 118, at 69.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. S. SPECIAL COMM. ON OFFICIAL CONDUCT, SENATE CODE OF OFFICIAL
CONDUCT, S. REP. No. 95-49, at 42 (1977) [hereinafter NELSON COMMITTEE
REPORT]. The Report identified a substantially similar version of what is now

Rule 37(4) as then Rule 45(4). See id. at 41.
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introduce, work for, and vote for the passage of a bill that would
boost or maintain price supports for milk products, while "not
fall[ing] under the strictures of this Rule."14 8 As the Nelson
Committee explained:
The strong presumption would be that the Member was
working for legislation because of the public interest and the
needs of his constituents and that his own financial interest
was only incidentally related. In the terminology of [Rule
37(4)], the dairy farmer would be part of a class affected by the
legislation, but not a member of a "limited class." . .. [A] class

of people or enterprises sharing a particular economic interest
(i.e. dairy farmers; shoemakers; disabled veterans) would not
be a "limited class."1 49
The Nelson Committee went on to emphasize that Rule 37(4)'s
reference to "limited class" was intended to mean "the class of people
affected by a private bill."150 Thus, while the dairy farm senator
could push for the passage of price supports that benefit himself and
his constituents, he could not introduce or work for the passage of
legislation "to purchase a piece of land made up in part of a piece of
his property and in part of pieces of his neighbors' property, in order
to build a federal project there."15 Thus, as the Nelson Committee
envisioned, the prohibition in Rule 37(4) "addresses itself to the rare
case when the relationship between the legislator's private interest
and the public interest is dramatically different from the ordinary
situation."152

Legislation that affects publicly traded companies, and thereby
the value of a company's stock, is anything but a rare instance.
Thus, the same analysis that applied to the dairy farmer would
apply, for example, to a senator who owns a sizable amount of stock
in AT&T. (In 2011, fifty-two members of Congress reported holdings
in AT&T stock, at least six with holdings exceeding $100,000.)153
Despite stock investments that might create a conflict of interest,
that senator could push for wireless network legislation strongly
favoring large telecommunication providers because such companies

148. Id. at 42.
149. Id.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 221-23 (comparing Senate Rule

37(4) with Standing Rule 44(6), which governs financial interests in the context
of earmarks and limited tax benefits).
152. NELSON COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 147 (emphasis added).
153. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Most Popular Congressional Investments,
2011, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/overview.php?type
=P&year=2011 (last visited June 26, 2013).
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and their shareholders hardly constitute a "limited class." 1 5 4 Even if
that senator were acting for the "principal purpose" of increasing
profits for AT&T (a motivation that would be next to impossible to
show), the millions of shareholders in AT&T likely would not qualify
as a "limited class."155 And the Senate Manual leaves no doubt that
"[b]oth the 'principal purpose' and the 'limited class' test must be
met before [Rule 37(4)] precludes a Senator's involvement in a
legislative proposal."1 56 As such, Rule 37(4) plainly fails to capture
many of the securities investments that could possibly tempt a
senator toward self-interested decision making and away from his
fiduciary obligations.
Indeed, if this senator's actions were held to fiduciary
standards, the public would be freed from speculating about
whether his personal stock holdings in AT&T had influenced his
wireless network advocacy entirely, or substantially, or somewhat,
or not at all. The conflict component of a fiduciary obligation would
prohibit the senator from placing himself in a position in which he
might be tempted to place his own pecuniary interests ahead of the
public. Thus, in view of his sizeable stock holdings in AT&T, the
senator would have no choice but to refrain from working on the
wireless network legislation (and arguably from voting on it as well).
Beyond that, the avoidance component would constrain the senator's
ability to hold stocks that risked impairing his legislative
responsibilities. Thus, a substantial investment in AT&T would be
verboten if he were a member of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, & Transportation ("CS&T"), and particularly so
if he served on the Communications, Technology, and the Internet
Subcommittee. Arguably, any investment in the stock of AT&T
would be impermissible under fiduciary principles given the size of
that multinational corporation and the frequency with which it has
interests before Congress.
Yet, the Senate's view that such fiduciary rules are
unwarranted for lawmakers has not stopped it from imposing those

154. Cf. SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 118, at 70 (observing that the
Senate Ethics Committee had ruled in 1990 that "a Senator who owned shares
in a company that owed cable stations could participate in legislation directly
affecting cable companies").
The senator could also support legislation
awarding a government contract to AT&T. Although 18 U.S.C. § 431 prohibits
members of Congress from entering into or benefitting from contracts with the
federal government, government contracts with "any incorporated company for
the general benefit of such corporation" are exempt from this provision. 18
U.S.C. § 433 (2006).
155.

See infra text accompanying note 179 (discussing precedent in House

Ethics Manual involving appropriations for a project undertaken by a single
defense contractor in which a member owned a small fraction of widely traded
shares).
156. SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 118, at 69.
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rules on government officials in the executive and judicial branches.
An attorney at the FCC could not work on a new regulation for
wireless networks if she were to own a substantial amount of stock
in AT&T (in fact, federal law would bar her from investing in any
telecommunications firm), 157 and a federal judge who owned stock in
AT&T could not oversee a proceeding challenging an FCC
broadband regulation. In the absence of their respective recusal, the
FCC official could face criminal charges and the federal judge could
be disciplined, even if their financial interests were exceedingly
unlikely to influence their decision making and even if the officials
sincerely believed that their actions could be completely fair and
impartial. 15 8
Nor is the Senate's own presumption of virtuous decision
making carried forward to its legislative staffers, at least with
respect to staffers employed by Senate committees. In 1977, the
Nelson Committee recommended and the Senate adopted Rule 37(7),
which provides that
[a]n employee on the staff of a committee... shall divest
himself of any substantial holdings which may be directly
affected by the actions of the committee for which he works,
unless the Select Committee, after consultation with the
employee's supervisor, grants permission in writing to retain
such holdings or the employee makes other arrangements

acceptable

to the Select Committee and the employee's

supervisor to avoid participation in committee actions where
there is a conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof.159

In the view of the Nelson Committee, such disparate treatment was
justified because
unlike Senators, committee staff are not publicly accountable,
and despite public financial disclosure, their affairs are
unlikely to get the same kind of scrutiny from the public and
the press as Senators. At the same time, committee staff
members hold responsible positions. For these reasons, the
Committee believes that staff holdings should be treated with
particular care.160

157. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (prohibiting FCC officials from
holding investments in telecommunications companies).
158. See id.
159. Senate Rule 37, § 7, reprinted in SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note
118, at 322. By its terms, the rule applies only to committee staff earning more
than "$25,000 per annum and employed for more than ninety days in a calendar
year." Id.
160.

NELSON COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 147, at 44.
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Thus, absent special permission, a staffer employed by the CS&T
Committee could not hold a sizeable amount of stock in AT&T, even
if that staff member focused his own work entirely on oceans and
fisheries and lacked any discretion over decisions concerning
telecommunications. As such, Senate Rule 37(7) goes beyond what
fiduciary analysis would require.
Recall the Supreme Court's observation of the "evil" to which
statutory restraints on financial interests is directed.16 1
A
legislative effort that increases a lawmaker's wealth by
substantially affecting the value of a publicly traded company's
stock would certainly seem to constitute an activity "which arouse[s]
suspicions of malfeasance and corruption." 162 Such an action thus
"endangers the very fabric of a democratic society" by shattering the
people's "faith in those who govern."163
The Nelson Committee, however, was confident that the twin
mechanisms of financial disclosure and electoral accountability were
adequate safeguards against self-interested decision making by
lawmakers. For that reason, then, the Committee
resisted suggestions for elaborate schemes which would have
required that Senators not serve on certain committees, or
disqualify themselves from voting in every case when their
holdings or investments could pose a conflict of interest. No
Rule suggested to the Committee avoided conflicts without
totally undermining the Senator's ability to represent the
interests of his constituents. Consequently, the Committee
concluded that financial disclosure of all holdings and possible
conflicts was a preferable approach. 164
As we will see, among the Committee's "resisted suggestions" was
one by the NYCBA for a congressional rule requiring lawmakers to
"avoid all economic interests which may be specifically affected by
legislation within the jurisdiction of [their] committee[s]." 16 5
The Senate Manual leaves no doubt that the Nelson
Committee's expressed faith in financial disclosure and the electoral
process continues right up to the present. A rule requiring recusal,
as the Manual explains, would compromise the interests of the
lawmaker's constituents because
[t]hose who elect Senators and Congressmen are entitled to
have their elected representatives represent them by voting
and fully participating in all aspects of the legislative process.

161. United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961).
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
NELSON COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 147,
NYCBA 1970 REPORT, supra note 16, at 68.

at 4; accord id. at 10.
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This representation is carried out with the understanding that
the votes cast by the Senators and Congressmen are
predicated on their perceptions of the public interest and the
public good, not on personal pecuniary interest. 166
The Manual also emphasizes that "even a selective divestiture
of potentially conflicting assets is not required," in large part
because public disclosure "provide[s] the information necessary to
allow Members' constituencies to judge official conduct in light of
possible financial conflicts with private holdings."16 7
These
rationales for the differences across the three branches will be fully
explored in the Subpart that follows.
Before turning to that analysis, a final observation can be made
here. Senate Rule 37(4) and the ethical norms that stem from it
reveal a striking contrast between the loyalty obligation that
Congress envisions for itself and the duty of loyalty that operates in
corporations.
When personal financial interests are involved,
political judgments by congressional officials are substantially more
insulated from scrutiny than business judgments by corporate
officials. Directors who stand to gain personally from a corporate
transaction are denied any type of presumption, strong or otherwise,
that their votes are, in the words of the Nelson Committee,
"predicated on their perceptions . . . of the [corporation's] good, not
on personal pecuniary interest."168 Thus, in this regard at least,
corporate law takes fiduciary principles much more seriously.
2. The House of Representatives
Like the Senate, the ethics rules in the House are not tailored
toward avoiding (let alone eliminating) financial interests that could
possibly tempt lawmakers to favor their own pecuniary interests
ahead of the public they serve. The principal guard against selfinterested conduct by members of the House is Rule 23, paragraph 3
of the House Code of Official Conduct, which specifies that
[a] Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, officer, or
employee of the House may not receive compensation and may
not permit compensation to accrue to the beneficial interest of
such individual from any source, the receipt of which would
occur by virtue of influence improperly exerted from the
position of such individual in Congress. 169

166.
167.
168.

SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supranote 118,

at 69.

Id. at 124-25.
See supra note 147.

169. CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 112-161, at 934-35, para. 3 (2013) [hereinafter
HOUSE RULES] (Rule 23).
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The commentary in the House Ethics Manual, which is compiled by
the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (the
"Standards Committee"), clarifies that this provision governs
aspects of the "investments of House Members and employees."17 0
And the manual expressly states that "all Members, officers, and
employees are prohibited from improperly using their official
positions for personal gain." 71 But after quoting the NYCBA's
astute observation that "[m]uch distrust of government flows from
ambiguous circumstances where there is ground for suspicion that
officials are promoting their own welfare rather than the public's," 172
the Manual observes that
[a]s a general matter.. . Members and employees need not
divest themselves of assets upon assuming their positions, nor
must Members disqualify themselves from voting on issues
that generally affect their personal financial interests.
Instead, public financial disclosure provides a means of
monitoring and deterring conflicts. 173
That rather unambiguous message is followed by this statement:
"[n]o federal statute, regulation, or rule of the House absolutely
prohibits a member or House employee from holding assets that
might conflict with or influence the performance of official duties." 174
In addition to House Rule 23(3), a representative's financial
conflicts must be evaluated under House Rule 3, which provides that
"[e]very Member ... shall vote on each question put, unless he has a
direct personal or pecuniary interest in the event of such
question." 175 Longstanding House precedents, however, emphasize
that financial interests are disqualifying only when a member's vote
affects him or her directly as an individual and not merely as one of
a class. 176 The Manual provides the following examples:
Members holding stock in national banks have voted on
legislation "providing a national currency and to establish free
banking" since Members "do not have that interest separate

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 118, at 248.
Id. at 247.
Id. (quoting NYCBA 1970 REPORT, supra note 16, at 34).
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
HOUSE RULES, supra note 169, at 377 (Rule 3). The

closest Senate
175.
analogue to House Rule 3 is Senate Rule 12(3), which provides that a senator

"may decline to vote in committee or on the floor, on any matter when he
believes that this voting on such a matter would be a conflict of interest." See
SENATE

MANUAL

CONTAINING THE

STANDING RULES,

ORDERS, LAWS,

AND

RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc.
112-1, at 12, para. 3 (2011) [hereinafter SENATE RULES] (Rule 12).

176. HOUSE ETHICS1MANUAL, supra note 118, at 235.
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and distinct from a class, and, within the meaning of the rule,
distinct from the public interest." . . . The Speaker would not

rule that a Member owning stocks in breweries or distilleries
should be disqualified in voting on the proposed amendment to
the Constitution concerning prohibition of the manufacture
and sale of liquor. Members who were stockholders in or had
interests in import businesses voted on a tariff bill affecting
the import business since "the bill before us affects a very
large class.

. .

. The Chair would be surprised if there were not

hundreds of thousands of American citizens who were
stockholders in these companies . . ""7
Although both the House and the Senate construe their
respective rules to foreclose certain legislative activities that
produce pecuniary benefits for a "limited class" in which a lawmaker
is a member, House Rule 3 does not explicitly impose the same
"principal purpose" qualifier that appears in Senate Rule 37(4). But
it is possible that a qualifier grounded in a lawmaker's motivation
applies to House Rule 3 implicitly. For example, with no reference
at all to the lawmaker's reason(s) for supporting a bill, the Manual
suggests that Rule 3's voting disqualification for a pecuniary
interest "might apply if legislation affects only one specific business
or property, rather than a class or group of businesses or
properties."1 78 But in contravention, the Manual points to a more
recent precedent where the Standards Committee found that a
congressman's ownership of common stock in a defense contractor
corporation (1,000 shares out of more than 4.5 million outstanding)
was insufficient "'to disqualify him from voting on' an appropriations
bill authorizing funds for a project for which the corporation was
under contract with the government to perform."17 9 The different
conclusions contemplated by the Manual could perhaps have turned
on the lawmaker's "principal purpose." An insubstantial number of
shares in a widely traded corporation could negate an inference that

177. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting House precedents).
178. Id. (emphasis added) (citing, among other instances, a 1907 precedent
suggesting that if a member's vote were to be challenged, the chair should hold
that he lacked the right to vote on a bill specifically related to Central Pacific
Railroad, in view of his ownership of stock in that railroad).
179. Id. at 237 (quoting IN THE MATTER OF A COMPLAINT AGAINST REP. ROBERT
L.F. SIKES, H.R. REP. No. 94-1364, at 15 (1976)). The Standards Committee
found, however, that the congressman had wrongly used his official position for
personal benefit on two other occasions: when he "persuaded the organizers of a
privately held bank to sell him stock while he was using his congressional
position to promote authorization for the establishment of the bank" and when
he "sponsored legislation to remove restrictions on the development of property
in which he had a personal financial interest." HOUSE ETHICS M\ANUAL, supra
note 118, at 186. The congressman was ultimately reprimanded by the House.
See id. at 249.

OWNING STOCK WHILE MAKING LAW

2013]1

599

pecuniary gain was a principal purpose behind a decision to support
(or disfavor) a bill.
The House Manual acknowledges that sponsoring legislation,
committee participation, and contacting officials at executive
agencies entail "a degree of advocacy above and beyond that in
voting" and it observes that such activities require "added
circumspection" on the part of members as to whether they may
take such actions in view of their financial interests.1 80 The
Standards Committee advises members to consult with it for
guidance whenever they are "considering taking such action on a
matter that may affect [their] personal financial interests," and it
references in particular the rules and standards that "prohibit the
use of one's position for personal gain."181 But ethics experts and
government watchdog groups have been critical of the House
Standards Committee (and the Senate Ethics Committee as well) for
providing advisory opinions that typically "give support and
justification to lawmakers who take actions that intersect with their
personal financial holdings."182 Ethics experts are also quick to
point out the rarity of congressional self-discipline for legislative
actions relating to personal financial interests.183
As in the Senate, the House's current rules and norms
pertaining to financial investments are rooted in decisions that were
made in 1977. In the House, the analogue to the Nelson Report was
a report based on the recommendations of the House Commission on
Administrative Review's Task Force on Financial Ethics, which was
chaired by then-Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-Ind).184 And like the
Nelson Committee in the Senate, this House Commission considered
various approaches to conflicts that would have required lawmakers
"either to divest themselves of holdings which might cause potential
conflicts of interest or be disqualified from voting on issues which
affect their investments." 8 5 Finding "serious drawbacks" with such
approaches, the Commission concluded that
[i]n the case of investment income, then, the Commission's
belief is that potential conflicts of interest are best deterred
through disclosure and the discipline of the electoral process.
Other approaches are flawed both in terms of their
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 237.
Id.
See Kindy, et al., supra note 5.

183. See Insider Trading and CongressionalAccountability: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 112th Cong. 9-10 (2011)
[hereinafter

Senate STOCK Act Hearing] (testimony of Melanie

Sloan,

Executive Director, Center for Responsible Ethics in Washington ("CREW")).
184. See HOUSE COMM'N ON ADMIN. REVIEW, FINANCIAL ETHICS, H. Doc. 9573, at 9-10 (1977).
185. Id. at 9.
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reasonableness and practicality and threaten to impair rather

than to protect the relationship between the representative
and the represented. 186
The House Commission's strong preference for enhanced
financial disclosure in lieu of anticonflict restraints (which was
echoed by the Senate's Nelson Committee) materialized the
following year in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. The EIGA
converted existing congressional rules on financial disclosure into
stricter and more encompassing statutory requirements.1 8 7
A
decade later, a House Bipartisan Task Force on Ethics concluded
that the EIGA was achieving its anticonflicts objective:
The task force believes, in light of the ten year history of the
disclosure law under the Ethics in Government Act, that
public financial disclosure, coupled with the discipline of the
electoral process, remains the best safeguard and the most
appropriate method to deter and monitor potential conflicts of
interest in the legislative branch. 188
Whether public disclosure and electoral discipline are adequate
safeguards against self-interested legislative activity Get alone "the
best") is a question that has received surprisingly little scrutiny
from legal scholars. One important exception is Professor Richard
Painter, who recognizes that congressional concerns about the effect
of recusal on the process of democratic representation are
legitimate. But he emphasizes the other important democratic
values that are at stake as well. He therefore advocates a balancing
test, of sorts:
Preserving a member's power to sponsor and vote on
legislation is important, but public confidence in the integrity
of government is also important. The effect on legislative
process from a handful of members in the House or Senate
recusing on a bill would in most cases be less harmful than a
public perception that members are participating in matters in
which they have significant financial interests. Congress
should be willing to abide by, at least in its own rules if not a
criminal statute, a standard that is more similar to that which
it imposes on the executive branch. 189
Disqualification, moreover, is hardly the only way fiduciaries
can fulfill their duty of loyalty to their entrustors. Indeed, if ethics
186. Id. at 9-10. The House Manual quotes the Commission's conclusion
verbatim. HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 118, at 251.

187. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
188. BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE ON ETHIcS, 101ST CONG., REP. ON H.R. 3660, 22

(Comm. Print 1989).
189. PAINTER, supra note 3, at 148.
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rules and norms in Congress were to reflect the avoidance
component of a fiduciary obligation, concerns about diminution of
citizen voice and power would not even be implicated.
The House Manual, however, continues to depict the divestiture
alternative to recusal as both "impractical" and "unreasonable."19 0
It elaborates:
Members of Congress enter public service owning assets and
having private investment interests like other citizens.
Members should not "be expected to fully strip themselves of
worldly goods." Even a selective divestiture of potentially
conflicting assets could raise problems for a legislator. Unlike
many officials in the executive branch, who are concerned with
administration and regulation in a narrow area, a Member of
Congress must exercise judgment concerning legislation across
the entire spectrum of business and economic endeavors.
Requiring divestiture may also insulate legislators from the
personal and economic interests held by their constituencies,
or society in general, in governmental decisions and policy. 191
The "worldly goods" quote was drawn from the NYCBA's 1970
Report on congressional ethics, which included an unequivocal
recommendation for a divestiture rule, akin to the rule now
governing Senate Committee staffers.192
Particularly in the context of today's lawmakers and their
current financial investments, each of the concerns set out in the
House Manual regarding conflict avoidance through divestiture
rings hollow. Even a complete prohibition against holding stocks or
bonds in individual companies would allow lawmakers to retain
most other types of "worldly goods," including shares in diversified
mutual funds. Moreover, while lawmakers necessarily function as
generalists when casting floor votes on a bill, much discretionary
decision making occurs at the committee level, where lawmakers
function much more as specialists charged with overseeing
particular industries.
Concerns about "insulating" members from constituent interests
can be easily dismissed as well. A legislator from Wisconsin should
be able to zealously represent the interests of dairy farmers without
having his own personal wealth invested in livestock and farm
equipment. But even if an argument based on the value of "merged"
interests is valid in the context of some financial investments (the
citizens of Texas may wish-and may well be entitled-to send
oilmen to Washington), that argument loses traction with respect to
a lawmaker's passive investments in securities issued by publicly
HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 118, at 249-50.
191. Id. at 250 (quoting NYCBA 1970 REPORT, supra note 16, at 40).
192. See infra Subpart IV.B.1.
190.
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traded corporations. Owning portfolios with hundreds of thousands
of dollars invested in the stock of General Electric, J.P. Morgan, and
other multinational companies brings the typical lawmaker no
closer to the interests of his constituents than a portfolio with
shares in mutual funds that invest in those very same companies.
The remaining argument set out in the House Manual against a
divestment rule relates to the "discipline" that is said to be imposed
by the electoral process. To be sure, the EIGA's statutory scheme
for financial disclosure serves to inform the public about possibly
conflicting interests.
And stories in the media help voters
understand and appreciate the possible connections between a
particular lawmaker's investment holdings and his or her legislative
activity. 193 Yet, despite such transparency, the electoral process has
not proven to be a particularly effective vehicle for controlling
possibly self-serving legislative conduct, at least conduct which falls
short of serious corruption (leaving aside the numerous lawmakers
who have been reelected despite charges involving serious
corruption). 194 Officeholders in Congress clearly "have an advantage
over anyone who challenges their authority."195
Not only is reliance on the electoral process to reduce conflicts
an ineffective approach in practice, but it is also "deficient in
principle."196 The beneficiaries of an individual lawmaker's duty of
loyalty include not only those who voted for her but also the general
public. A lawmaker's actions on a congressional committee and any
leadership role she fulfills in the House or Senate impact the entire
nation. As Professor Dennis Thompson, a leading political science
scholar, points out:
Because legislative ethics provides .

. .

the preconditions for all

legislative action, citizens rightly take an interest in the
ethical conduct of all members, not only that of their own
representatives. In this respect their concern about ethical
conduct differs from their interest in any particular piece of
legislation.
Even on delegate conceptions of democratic
representation, constituents in any state or district may quite
properly instruct their representative to seek, through
procedures of the representative assembly, standards to
govern the ethical conduct of all representatives. That is part
of the rationale for the disciplinary authority of the ethics

193. See generally supra note 5 (citing front-page news articles); see also
infra text accompanying notes 232-42.
194. PAINTER, supra note 3, at 8-10.
195. Id. at 5.
196. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 137 (1995).
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committees and ultimately for Congress's constitutional power
of expulsion. 197

Thus, 'letting members disclose and voters decide" is a defense of
the status quo that is grounded in a "mistaken view of democratic
representation." 198
Once again, an analogy to the corporate world is instructive.
Under the corporate law of every state, directors are chosen by a
vote of the corporation's shareholders. But corporate law does not
look solely to elections to guard against agency problems such as
conflicted decision making on the part of directors. 199 Instead, the
fiduciary duty of loyalty performs much of that work. As the
Delaware Supreme Court emphasized in Guth v. Loft, 200 "[t]he rule
that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation
demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and selfinterest." 201 Section 144(a)(2) does provide a mechanism by which
shareholders in Delaware may effectively waive the protections of
the fiduciary obligation that is owed to the corporation. 202 But
section 144(a)(2) is a transaction-specific provision that requires a
majority of disinterested shareholders to vote in good faith, after full
disclosure of the interested director's conflict, in favor of the
transaction. Even if all potential conflicts had been fully disclosed
to shareholders in a proxy statement, a director's election (even by
the vote of a majority of disinterested shareholders) would not serve
to sanitize all interested-director transactions proposed in the
future. Shareholder votes on each separate interested-director
transaction would be necessary. And, in the absence of such a vote
by shareholders, the fiduciary rule that requires undivided and
unselfish loyalty to the corporation would not be deemed to have
been waived.
3.

The Special Case of Earmarks

Interestingly, in both the House and the Senate, financial
conflicts of interest are subject to a special rule when the legislative
activity at issue involves a congressional earmark, a limited tax
benefit, or a limited tariff benefit (often referred to collectively as
"earmarks").203 Made (in)famous by frequent references in the
media to a $223 million "Bridge to Nowhere," earmarks are typically
197. Id. at 138.
198. Id. at 137.
199. Rave, supra note 3, at 676-77.
200. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
201. Id. at 510.
202. See supra text accompanying note 34; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
144(a)(2) (2011).

203. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and
Statutory Interpretation,94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 521 & n.6 (2009).
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defined as a targeted spending request by one, and sometimes two
or more, members of Congress for a particular project or
beneficiary. 204 The earmark "is often inserted in the latter stages of
a bill's journey through Congress, generally in the accompanying
committee report."205
Agency problems redound in the legislative process that results
in earmarks. Even though taxpayers generally understand that the
sum total of funds expended on targeted projects can usually be
spent more efficiently in a manner that aligns more closely with
national priorities, anticipated campaign contributions from
lobbyists and the immediate beneficiaries of earmarks often sway
lawmakers to sponsor them-even for projects located outside of
their own state or district. 206 While Congress is unlikely to enact a
permanent ban on legislative earmarks, both chambers in recent
years have instituted temporary moratoriums as part of a series of
measures to control deficit spending.207
The firestorm against earmarks began to ignite in the mid2000s after investigatory reports in the media spotlighted wasteful
spending in general and earmark abuses in particular. 208 The public
backlash, fueled with activism by CREW and other government
watchdog groups, prompted Congress in 2007 to reform the earmark
process by increasing transparency and accountability. 2 0 9 Pursuant
to these reforms, lawmakers who request earmarks are required to
file written statements (easily accessible to the public) that disclose:
the lawmaker's name; the name and address of the intended
recipient of an earmark (or the location of the intended activity if
there is no intended recipient); the name of the beneficiary in the
case of a limited tax or tariff benefit; the purpose of the earmark or
limited tax or tariff benefit; and a certification that neither the

204. PAINTER, supra note 3, at 153 (observing that the proposed Gravina
Island Bridge in Alaska was an earmark sponsored by Senator Ted Steven (RAK)).

205. Id.
206. Id. at 155 (discussing press reports about a $10 million highway
interchange project in Florida promoted by a congressman in Alaska).
207. See Fawn Johnson, Does the Earmark Moratorium Hurt Congress?,
NATIONALJOURNAL (Aug. 26, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.nationaljournal.com
/insiders/transportation/does-the-earmark-moratorium-hurt-congress-20130826;
Manu Raju, Earmarks Aren't Gone for Good, POLITIcO (Jan. 5, 2011 4:40 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47063.html.
208. See Melanie Sloan, Earmark Reform: Building a Bridge to Somewhere,
AM),
2010,
9:45
(Oct.
7,
POST
Blog,
HUFFINGTON
The
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melanie-sloanlearmark-reform-buildinga_b_753962.html (discussing five-point plan "to clean up the congressional
earmarking process").
209. See Kysar, supra note 203, at 534-35 (discussing the political factors
that precipitated the adoption of earmark rules).
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member nor certain related persons has a pecuniary interest in the
earmark or limited tax or tariff benefit. 210
The certifications required under the earmark rules in both
chambers appear similar at first blush, but there are differences
that may be significant. House Rule 23, paragraph 17 of the House
Code of Official Conduct requires
[a] Member . ..

who requests a congressional earmark, a

limited tax benefit, or a limited tariff benefit in any bill or joint
resolution (or an accompanying report) or in any conference
report on a bill or joint resolution (or an accompanying joint
statement of managers) . . . [to] provide a written statement to

the chair and ranking minority member of the committee of
jurisdiction, ... that. .. [certifies] that the Member .. . or
spouse has no financial interest in such congressional earmark
or limited tax or tariff benefit. 211
Committees with jurisdiction over a particular earmark or tax
benefit request are responsible for determining whether Rule
23(17)'s heightened disclosure requirements (including the "no
financial interest" certification) are triggered. 212
Whether a member of the House (and/or a spouse) has a
"financial interest" in an earmark depends on his or her particular
financial circumstances and the specific facts surrounding the
request.2 13 But the House Manual observes that
[a]s a general matter, a financial interest would exist in an
earmark when it would be reasonable to conclude that the
provision would have a direct and foreseeable effect on the
pecuniary interests of the Member or the Member's spouse.
Such interests may be related to financial assets, liabilities,or
other interests of the Member and spouse, such as investments
214
in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, or real estate.

An "effect is foreseeable if it is anticipated or predictable." 215 The
House Manual also quotes (presumably by analogy) the OGE
regulation that defines the term "predictable" for purposes of the
federal statute that criminalizes conflicts of interest for the
executive branch. 2 16 Direct and foreseeable effects on a House
210. See HOUSE RULES, supra note 169 at 942-43,
RULES, supra note 92 at 175, para. 6 (Rule 44).

para. 17 (Rule 23);

SENATE

211. Id.
212. HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 118, at 238.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 239 n.108
216. Id. at 239 (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 2640.103(a)(3)(ii) (2012)).
Section
2640.103(a)(3)(ii) "defin[es] the term 'predictable' as 'real, as opposed to a
speculative possibility that the matter will affect the financial interest."' Id.
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member's (or spouse's) pecuniary interests are contrasted explicitly
with financial interests that are "remote, inconsequential, or
speculative."2 17 Two differing situations are depicted:
For example, if a Member proposed an earmark or tax or tariff
benefit assisting a certain company, the Member generally
would not be considered to have a financial interest in the
provision by owning shares in a diversified mutual fund,
employee benefit plan (e.g., the Thrift Savings Plan or similar
state benefit plan), or pension plan that, in turn, holds stock in
the company. However, a Member's direct ownership of stock,
even a small number of shares in a widely held company, likely
would constitute a financial interest under Rule 23.218
The 2007 earmark reform in the House therefore appears to
have altered the conventional financial conflict-of-interest analysis,
at least to a certain extent. Consider, for example, a lawmaker who
owns $50,000 of stock in Dynamic Defense Corp. ("DD Corp.") and is
contemplating an earmark request directed at DD Corp. for several
million dollars in funding to assist its development of a new type of
body armor for the military. Before the reforms took effect, little
would have prevented the lawmaker from requesting such an
earmark, even if he had owned thousands of dollars in DD Corp.
stock. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the request would have
violated the House rule that proscribes personal gain from
legislative activity,2 1 9 and even if the request were in fact improper,
there is little chance that the lawmaker's conflict would have even
been detected, let alone become the fodder for a congressional
disciplinary proceeding. Now, however, with House Rule 23(17)'s
certification requirement in place, that lawmaker would be unable
to file a truthful statement that he had "no financial interest in such
congressional earmark." Thus, Rule 23(17) would foreclose his
earmark request (or require divestment) and, at least in this
instance, eliminate the financial conflict of interest.
In the Senate, however, one can reasonably question whether
the "special" financial conflict-of-interest rule that applies to
earmarks alters the conventional analysis, even to a limited degree.
The Senate adopted its version of an earmark certification rule as
part of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007.220
The Act added a new Rule 44, paragraph 6, to the Standing Rules of
the Senate, which provides:

217. Id.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. See supra text accompanying note 169 (quoting House Rule 23(3)).
220. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 10081, § 521, 121 Stat. 735, 760-64.
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A Senator who requests a congressionally directed spending
item, a limited tax benefit, or a limited tariff benefit in any bill
or joint resolution (or an accompanying report) or in any
conference report on a bill or joint resolution (or an
accompanying joint statement of managers) shall provide a
written statement to the chairman and ranking minority
member of the committee of jurisdiction, ... [that certifies] that
neither the Senator nor the Senator's immediate family has a
pecuniary interest in the item, consistent with requirements of
paragraph9.221

In the absence of the italicized language, Senate Rule 44(6) would
closely resemble the "no financial interest" certification requirement
in the House, except that it more broadly encompasses a lawmaker's
immediate family members (a term which includes children and
parents as well as a spouse). But paragraph 9 of Rule 44 provides:
No Member, officer, or employee of the Senate shall knowingly
use his official position to introduce, request, or otherwise aid
the progress or passage of congressionally directed spending
items, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits a principal
purpose of which is to further only his pecuniary interest, only
the pecuniary interest of his immediate family, or only the
pecuniary interest of a limited class of persons or enterprises,
when he or his immediate family, or enterprises controlled by
them, are members of the affected class. 222
The effect of paragraph 9 on paragraph 6 is not entirely clear.
The "no pecuniary interest" certification requirement in Senate Rule
44(6) may, on one hand, be read to encompass only those earmarks
that satisfy both a "principal purpose" test and a "limited class" test.
As such, the Senate's "special" rule for earmarks would merely
reflect the general prohibition that already exists under Senate Rule
37(4).223 On the other hand, the Senate may construe Rule 44(6)'s
certification requirement without any such qualification from
paragraph 9. And in that event, as in the House, a lawmaker with
$50,000 of stock in DD Corp. would be foreclosed from requesting
any earmark directed at DD Corp., notwithstanding his or her
motivation.
C.

Lawmakers as Investors
Except in the special case of earmarks (which are political hot
potatoes, in their own right), the nearly forty-year-old view that
financial conflicts are best deterred by public disclosure and the
221. SENATE RULES, supra note 92 at 175, para. 6 (emphasis added) (Rule
44).
222. Id. para. 9 (Rule 44).
223. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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discipline of the electoral process continues to dictate the ethical
norms in Congress. Although all federal officials owe duties of trust
and loyalty to the public, only congressional officials are left almost
entirely on their own to decide for themselves what financial
interests might be inconsistent with those duties.
But much has changed since 1977, when Congress last accorded
the financial conflict issue extensive scrutiny.
Among other
changes, recent years have shown a much higher rate of personal
wealth in Congress, substantially higher percentages of stock
ownership among lawmakers, much more federal intervention in the
economy and operations of private-sector businesses, and a
heightened public awareness that lawmakers routinely profit from
securities investments that intersect with their legislative
activities. 2 24
Most lawmakers in Congress are very wealthy, and the number
of millionaires continues to rise. 225 Public disclosure forms filed for
2010 revealed that 250 lawmakers had an estimated net worth of
more than $1 million: 183 of 435 Representatives (42%) and 67 of
100 Senators (67%).226
These figures, however, substantially
understate net worth because they do not reflect the value of
personal or secondary residences that are not incoming producing
and the EIGA's disclosure instructions allow investments and other
assets to be reported in dollar amount ranges. Less than twenty
years ago, 51 Representatives (12%) and 26 Senators were
millionaires (26%).227
Stock ownership by members of Congress has also soared over
the last several decades. 228 Academic researchers in one often-cited
study examined disclosure reports from 650 members who served in
the Senate and House between 2004 and 2008. They found that
"422 [65%] reported holding a stock listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ or

224. Robert O'Harrow Jr. et al., Rise in Stock Ownership Among Lawmakers
Brings Ethics Concerns, WP Politics, WASH. PosT (Nov. 23, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rise-in-stock-ownership-among
-lawmakers-brings-ethics-concerns/2012/01/28/gIQArB2UYQ-story.html.
225. See Stephanie Condon, Wealth in Congress Climbed as Others Saw Net
Worth Stay Stagnant, Reports Show, CBSNEWS (Dec. 27, 2011, 12:57 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57348729-503544/wealth-in
-congress-climbed-as-others-saw-net-worth-stay-stagnant-reports-show/ ("[T]he
net worth of lawmakers on Capitol Hill has jumped considerably in recent
decades.").
226. Michael Beckel, Most Members of Congress Enjoy Robust Financial
Status, Despite Nation's Sluggish Economic Recovery, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov.
15, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/11/congress-enjoys
-robust-financial-status.html.
227. Craig Winneker & Jonathan Ringel, The Roll Call Fifty, ROLL CALL,
Jan. 20, 1992.

228. See O'Harrow et al., supra note 5.
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AMEX at some point during that period." 229 To be sure, many
lawmakers currently have investment portfolios comprised mostly of
shares in diversified mutual funds and/or government securities,
including U.S. treasuries and municipal bonds. 230 A far smaller
percentage of lawmakers hold their assets in qualified blind trustsfewer than twenty lawmakers reported such trusts in 2010.231
In addition to the sharp rise in stock ownership by lawmakers,
recent years have brought congressional intervention in private
sector businesses at unprecedented levels, with trillions of taxpayer
dollars allocated for bank and auto company bailouts, health care
reform, and economic stimulus projects. 232 Legislative decisions
thus have a much greater likelihood of affecting the economic
bottom line of publicly traded corporations-triggering direct and
foreseeable impacts on the value of stock holdings in lawmakers'
portfolios.

229. Andrew Eggers & Jens Hainmueller, Capitol Losses: The Mediocre
Performanceof CongressionalStock Portfolios, 75 J. POL. 535, 541 (2013).
230. See O'Harrow et al., supra note 5, at Al, A4; Brody Mullins et al., Stock
Law Leaves Congress Leeway, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2013, at A7 (reporting that
in 2012, "[s]everal members of Congress moved to shield themselves from
criticism by selling individual stocks and shifting to mutual funds"); see also
Paul Kane & Carol D. Leonnig, Lawmakers Invested in Bailed-Out
Firms, WASH.
POST,
June
11,
2009,
at
A4,
available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-06-11/politics/3686122 1_1_lawmakers
-stock-holdings-disclosure (observing that then-Representative Barney Frank
(D-Mass) "does not invest directly in stocks, instead concentrating largely on
state and local bonds, with a small amount directed into mutual funds" and
quoting Frank's statement that "I get a steady 4.5 percent, and I help my state
in the process. I'm a patriot, and I'm making money, too.").
231. See Anne VanderMey, Who Needs a Blind Trust?, CNNMONEY (Oct. 22,
2012, 12:55 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/10/22/blind-trust-mitt
-romney/ (f'eporting that seven senators and twelve representatives had
qualified blind trusts in place in 2010). Blind trusts serve to mitigate conflicts
by removing the owner's control over the particular assets held by the trust. See
JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21656, THE USE OF BLIND TRUSTS BY
FEDERAL OFFICIALS 1 (2005) (stating that "the use of a 'blind trust' is one of
several methods of conflict of interest avoidance under federal law and
regulation"); NYCBA 1970 REPORT, supra note 16, at 62-63 (endorsing the blind
trust method of conflict avoidance and observing that "[w]hile not a full
divestment of the assets involved, appropriate provision in the trust instrument
can advance the desired independence of official decision-making"). But see
Megan J. Ballard, The Shortsightedness of Blind Trusts, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 43,
71 (2007) (suggesting changes to the EIGA and congressional rules that would
"strengthen compliance, improve the way a trustee's performance is monitored,
and enhance the independence of a trustee").
232. See O'Harrow et al., supra note 5, at A4; cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 299 (2011) (observing
that "the massive increase in federal involvement in financial markets and
corporate governance as a result of the financial crisis of 2008 has made [insider
trading] opportunities . .. even more widely available to government officials").
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Possible connections between the stock investments of a
particular lawmaker and his or her legislative actions can be drawn
fairly easily. For almost a decade, the Center for Responsive Politics
("CRP"), a nonprofit research group, has been transcribing the
annual paper disclosure reports filed by lawmakers and providing
that data on its website (www.opensecrets.org). A few clicks on a
computer mouse can produce a list of the "most popular
congressional investments," which in turn reveals not only the top
fifty publicly traded corporations in which lawmakers are most
heavily invested but also a specific value range of the investments
for each identified lawmaker. 233 Journalists, particularly the
authors of the Washington Post's "Capitol Assets" series, have made
full use of the CRP's data, systemically comparing particular
lawmakers' stock investments with their legislative activity. 234 The
Washington Post has supplemented this extensive series of reports
with an interactive database that allows users to (literally) connect
the dots between congressional committee service and a lawmaker's
stock investments. 235
Among other findings, these reports in the Washington Post
reveal that
*

between the years 2007 and 2010, 130 lawmakers or
their families traded, stock-totaling between $85
million and $218 million-in 323 companies registered
to lobby on bills that came before their committees; 236

*

roughly in that same time period, 73 lawmakers either
"sponsored or co-sponsored legislation . . . that could

*

either they or
benefit businesses or industries in which
237
their families are involved or invested;"
nearly 30 key lawmakers-with health-industry stock
holdings totaling between $11 million and $27
health-care
landmark
draft
million-helped

233. See generally Most Popular Congressional Investments, 2011,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/overview.php?type=P
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
&year=2011 (last visited June 26, 2013) (indicating "the most common assets
among all members of Congress who served during all or part of 2011, ranked
by the number of members invested in them, with breakdowns by party").
234. See generally supra note 5 (citing seven front-page news articles).
235. See generally Capitol Assets: A Close-Up Look at Congressional Wealth,
WASH. PosT, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/gallery/capitol-assets/ (last
visited June 26, 2013); A Close-Up Look at Congressional Wealth, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/capitol-assets/congressional
-wealth-risk-matrix/ (last visited June 26, 2013) (revealing how the 535
Members of Congress position their investment portfolios and their wins (and
losses) on Wall Street).

236. Keating et al., supra note 5.
237. Kindy et al., supra note 5, at All.
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legislation, 238 and "[i]n the medical-device field alone,
108 lawmakers collectively own between $6 million
and $14 million worth of stock;" 239
during the financial crisis, at least 18 of the 60
members of the House Financial Services Committee
held stock in firms that received federal bailout
assistance; 240
between 2004 and 2009, 19 of the 28 senators on the
Senate Armed Services Committee held assetstotaling between $3.8 million and $10.2 million-in
companies under contract with the Pentagon; 241 and
many
House
and
Senate committees
have
memberships with "disproportionately large holdings
in companies or industries they oversee . . . ."242

Although the composite picture falls short of proving that
lawmakers place their personal financial interests ahead of the
public they serve, a large segment of the public has apparently
taken away that disturbing message. 24 3 And because anticonflict
measures are "more concerned with what might have happened in a
given situation then what actually happened," 244 the public
perception is the very problem that requires the cure.
The Washington Post's "Capitol Assets" series also reveals
important insights about lawmakers and their own views about the
overlap between their stock investments and their legislative
activity.2 4 5 Indeed, the lawmakers who were contacted in connection

238. Kane, supra note 5.

239. O'Harrow et al., supra note 5, at A6.
240. Kane &Leonnig, supra note 230.
241. Higham et al., supra note 5, at A2; see also Conflicting Standards,

WASH. PosT, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/conflicting
-senate-standards/ (last visited June 26, 2013).
242. O'Harrow & Keating, supra note 5 at A6 (reporting, among other
examples, that: House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee members
"as a group owned almost six times more holdings in transportation firms";
House Energy and Commerce Committee members had "heavier than average
investments in companies such as Oracle, Nokia, AT&T and Verizon"; senators
on the Environment and Public Works Committee "had almost three times the
value of agribusiness holdings as their colleagues on other committees"; and
senators on the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee "had on
average almost twice the value of holdings in finance, insurance and real estate
as that chamber as a whole").
243. See infra notes 256-62 and accompanying text (quoting observations by
several lawmakers).
244. United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 550 (1961).
245. See David S. Fallis et al., Congressional Earmarks Sometimes Used to
Fund Projects Near Lawmakers' Properties, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2012, at Al,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/congressional
available
at
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with many of the reports frequently emphasized their full
compliance with the Senate or House rules on financial investments
as well as with the public disclosure provisions of the EIGA.246 For
example, when nineteen senators on the Senate Armed Services
Committee were asked to comment on the propriety of their
individual stock holdings in defense contractors, nearly a dozen of
them responded through a spokesperson that he or she has always
strictly adhered to all Senate rules about financial investments and
fully disclosed all such investments. 247
Lawmakers' views of their own investment decisions have
prompted others to question whether the traditional means for
deterring lawmakers' financial conflicts-public disclosure coupled
with the electoral process-could actually be exacerbating the risk of
self-interested legislative activity. Indeed, research in the field of
behavioral economics shows that "[o]nce people disclose a potential
conflict ... they often feel morally absolved-which can blind them
to the possibility that they may still be biased." 2 4 8 Moreover,
because .'[p]eople can be biased by surprisingly small incentives,. . .
even . . . a congressman's [modest] portfolio . . . could still influence

249
his behavior in votes and hearings."'
Given lawmakers' status as fiduciaries and the accumulated
knowledge about lawmakers as stock market investors, what
explains the fact that nearly forty-year-old decisions continue to
dictate current congressional norms with respect to financial
conflicts of interest?
Apart from concerns about insulating lawmakers from the
interests of their constituents, 2 5 0 the other primary concern is that a
divestment rule would alter incentives to serve in Congress.
Although some have argued that a divestiture requirement could
jeopardize our nation's ability to attract and retain talented
politicians and staffers to Congress, 251 it is also possible that an

-earmarks-sometimes-used-to-fund-projects-near-lawmakersproperties/2012/01/12/gIQA97HGvQ story.html.
246. See Conflicting Standards, supra note 241 (showing responses from
senators).
247. See Higham et al., supra note 5, at A2; see also Conflicting Standards,
supra note 241 (hyperlinking verbatim text of the spokespersons' responses).
248. See Jason Zweig, A Perk of Power: Trading in Companies You Oversee,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2010, at B10, available at http://online.wsj.com/article
(citing Professor
/SB10001424052702304703104575174124009720464.html

George Loewenstein, a behavioral economist at Carnegie Melon).
249. Id.
250. See supra text accompanying note 191.
251. See Higham et al., supra note 5, at A2 (reporting the view by
congressional experts that divestiture rules "would deter good candidates for
office").
In 1961, the Senate Armed Services Committee discussed the
possibility of extending its defense contractor divestiture rule for senior
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even greater number of persons may be drawn to serve in an
institution that has opted to take fiduciary principles more
seriously. 252 The question, of course, is an empirical one. But
modern portfolio theory instructs that most investors who hold
stocks and bonds in individual companies will not be able to achieve
benchmark-beating returns. 253 Although at one time researchers
suggested that congressional officials had investment portfolios that
substantially outperformed the overall stock market, 2 54 a more
recent study indicates otherwise, finding that the average lawmaker
underperformed the market by between 2% and 3% annually. 255
Ironically, then, a precommitment strategy that would tie
lawmakers to the mast of passive index funds could actually
increase lawmakers' aggregate wealth. With a stock divestiture
requirement in place for ten years, we might actually see even
greater numbers of millionaires in Congress.
IV. ACHIEVING GREATER PARITY

As the foregoing reveals, the anticonflict rules that govern
Congress's members and employees are substantially less restrictive
than the statutes and rules that apply to federal officials in the
executive and judicial branches. Legislation (or Senate and House
rules) limiting the type of securities that congressional officials may
own would be an important first step toward greater parity.
Because lawmakers are expected to work and vote on a multitude of
issues that impact particular industries and often specific
companies, the rigid recusal requirements that govern executive
branch officials and judges are neither workable nor appropriate as
Department of Defense officials to its own committee members. Although
several senators spoke in favor of changing the double standard, other senators
expressed opposition. Then-Senator Prescott Bush (R-Conn.) contended: "When
you pass a law like that, you will have the greatest mass resignation that the
world has ever seen . . . For heaven's sake, if you want to bring together a lot of
people that do not have any touch with reality in this country to make the laws,
God help the United States, in my judgment." Id. (quoting hearing transcript).
The question was never called to a vote. Id.
252. Congress could ease the financial burden on legislative branch officials
by amending the tax code to allow for the deferral of any capital gains that
result from securities sales that were subject to a divestiture rule. See supra
text accompanying note 95.
253. See generally BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL
STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 195-214 (10th
ed. 2012).
254. Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock

Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 13 Bus. & POL. 1,
1 (2011); Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock
Investments of the U.S. Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661, 669
(2004).
255. See Eggers & Hainmueller, supra note 229, at 536.
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a standard solution for lawmakers.
Rules requiring securities
divestment, on the other hand, would be both workable and
appropriate. Indeed, federal agency officials often operate under
strict divestiture requirements that are expressly designed to
thwart public perceptions of personal financial gain from agency
actions, programs, or policies.
A.

Additional Reasons for Change
There are several reasons why the timing is particularly apt for
conflicts-of-interest reform in the legislative branch that would
begin with limitations on securities investments.
First and
foremost, a divestiture requirement would combat the troubling
perception that congressional officials can-and routinely do-place
their own financial well-being ahead of the best interests of the
public they serve. Although lawmakers clearly take issue with that
perception's accuracy, they have been candid in acknowledging its
widespread persistence. Indeed, lawmakers know all too well that
"Americans rate Members of Congress at or near the bottom of the
list when it comes to perceived honesty and ethical standards;" 256
that "[m]ost Americans think that everything done in the financial
crisis was done to help specific institutions and specific people;" 2 5 7
and that there is "a sense that elites in Washington are using their
positions to get ahead financially."258
Lawmakers likewise
appreciate that "the public opinion of Congress [is] so bad ...
because Congress has been so bad,"2 59 that "there is a breakdown of
trust,"2 60 and that "the American people ... deserve the right to
know that their lawmakers' only interest is in what is best for the
country, not what is best for their own financial interests." 26 1 As
Senator Joseph Lieberman emphasized at the start of the Senate
Hearing on the STOCK Act, if the "law seems to allow Members of
Congress to take advantage of their public position for personal
gain, the trust that needs to exist between the American people and
our government will be further eroded." 262
256. Senate STOCK Act Hearing,supra note 183, at 3 (statement of Ranking
Member Susan Collins).
257. House STOCK Act Hearing, supra note 119, at 6 (statement of Rep.
Bradley Miller).
258. 158 CONG. REc. S241 (daily ed. Feb.1, 2012) (statement of Sen. Sherrod
Brown).
259. 158 CONG. REC. S148 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2012) (statement of Sen. Joseph
Lieberman).
260. Senate STOCK Act Hearing, supra note 183, at 6 (testimony by Sen.
Scott Brown).
261. Id. at 5 (testimony by Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand).
262. Id. at 1 (opening statement of Chairman Joseph Lieberman). See also

Frank

Newport,

Congress Begins 2013

with 14% Approval, Politics,

GALLUP (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159812/congress-begins-
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Legislative branch reforms that would place limitations on
securities ownership would also save countless hours of government
time. Some of this time involves work by the members and staffers
on the Standards and Ethics Committees in the Senate and House,
who respond each year to literally thousands of requests from
lawmakers seeking legal advice on a range of activities, "including
their work on legislation that might pose a conflict."263 Moreover, in
the wake of the STOCK Act, individual members and senior staff
must now file transaction reports within forty-five days of a
securities purchase or sale. 2 64 These reports are likely being
reviewed by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, if
not regularly, at least sporadically. Far fewer advisory ethics
opinions would need to be rendered and far fewer transaction forms
would need to be filed and reviewed if members and employees of
Congress were generally prohibited from owning any securities
other than government securities or shares in diversified mutual
funds.
Even more important than the time savings, legislative branch
reform would substantially facilitate compliance with the STOCK
Act's substantive restrictions.
Although the insider trading
prohibitions arising under the federal securities laws extend only to
actions with "corrupt intent," 26 5 an anticonflict restraint that
essentially prohibits stock trading outright would be an important
guard against inadvertent trading while in possession of material
nonpublic government information. Lawmakers and staffers have
access to a wide array of material nonpublic information pertaining
to specific industries and the general economy, and managing to
avoid trading while aware of such information is a difficult
endeavor. 266 Indeed, a lawmaker who sells stock in a company

2013-approval.aspx (reporting that the 2012's yearly average of 15% was "the
lowest in Gallup's 38-year history of asking" the [approval/disapproval]
question). For a student note highlighting Congress's image problem, see
generally Paul D. Brachman, Note, Outlawing Honest Graft, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL'Y 261 (2013).
263. See Kindy et al., supra note 5 (reporting that between 2007 and 2011,
"lawyers for the two committees issued at least 2,800 written opinions to
lawmakers, sent 6,500 e-mails containing advice and provided guidance over
the phone 40,000 times, according to records kept by the two committees").
264. See MASKELL, supra note 61, at 1 ("The act .. . requires public reporting
within 30 days of receipt of a notice of a covered financial transaction (but in no
event more than 45 days after such [a] transaction.").
265. House STOCK Act Hearing, supra note 119, at 32, 40-41 (statement of
Robert Khuzami, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement).
266. For news reports raising questions about suspiciously timed securities
trading, see, e.g., Kimberly Kindy et al., Lawmakers Reworked Financial
Portfolios After Talks with Fed, Treasury Officials, WASH. POST, June 25, 2012,
at A7 (reporting that at least "34 members of Congress recast their financial
portfolios following phone calls or meetings with high-ranking Treasury
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precisely to avoid the appearance of self-interested decision making
could actually be creating a problem for herself under federal insider
trading law if she were aware of material nonpublic information at
the time of that sale.2 67
Limitations on the ownership of stock in individual companies
would likewise bolster the STOCK Act's initial public offering
("IPO") provision, which prohibits federal officials from purchasing
securities in an IPO "in any manner other than is available to
members of the public generally." 268 Because the investor demand
for shares in an IPO usually exceeds the supply, underwriter
allocations often preference institutional investors and wealthy
to Wall Street. 269
individual investors with connections
Distinguishing between the typical allocation process and illegal
preferential treatment extended to lawmakers will be quite a
challenge, to say the least.
Finally, heightened restrictions on lawmakers' securities
holdings could pave the way for further conflict-of-interest reform in
connection with other financial investments. Standards and ethics
committees in the House and the Senate might, for example, be
more inclined to forsake longstanding interpretations of existing
rules by issuing new guidance that would recommend conflict
avoidance relating to other types of investments. New limitations
on securities ownership could also spark additional rulemaking
efforts. For instance, the "no financial interest" certification now
required to accompany a lawmaker's earmark request could be
expanded to encompass anticipated property appreciation if the
location of a proposed public works project is next to or within a few
miles of residential, commercial, or investment property owned by
the lawmaker or a spouse. 270

Department and Federal Reserve officials during the economic crisis"); Brody
Mullins et al., Congress Staffers Gain from Trading in Stocks, WALL ST. J., Oct.
11, 2010, at Al (reporting the newspaper's "analysis of more than 3,000
disclosure forms covering trading activity by Capitol Hill staffers for 2008 and
2009").
267. See Nagy, supra note 128, at 1129 (discussing the "awareness" standard
set out in SEC Rule 10b5-1).
268. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 12, 126 Stat. 291, 300 (2012)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(i)).

269. See Stephen Gandel, The IPO Market's Hottest Craze: Dividends, Term
Sheet, CNNMONEY (Apr. 15, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com
/2013/04/15/ipos-dividends/ (explaining investor demand for IPO dividend
stocks); OFF. INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOcAcY, SEC, SEC Pub. No. 133, INVESTING
IN AN IPO 2 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ipo
-investorbulletin.pdf ("underwriters ... will distribute most of the shares in the
IPO to their institutional and high net-worth clients").

270. See David S. Fallis et al., CongressionalEarmarks Sometimes Used to
Fund Projects Near Lawmakers' Properties, WASH. POST., Feb. 6, 2012, at Al,
available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-02-06/politics/35442262_1
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B.

Specific Proposals
As reflected in the rare bipartisan momentum that fueled the
STOCK Act's passage (by near unanimous votes of 96-3 in the
Senate and 417-2 in the House), 271 congressional ethics reform is a
legislative priority around which liberals, moderates, and
conservatives can and should unite. It is also a priority strongly
supported by President Obama, who has urged Congress on at least
two occasions to "limit any elected official from owning stocks in
industries that they have the power to impact." 2 7 2 The subsections
that follow set forth two specific proposals for limiting the securities
investments that may be held by members and employees during
their public service in Congress.
1.

Investment LimitationsBased on Committee Service

As a "Congress of committees, not individuals," 273 financial
conflicts-of-interest reform should begin with investment limitations
tied to a lawmaker's committee membership. Although Congress
chose not to travel down this path when the NYCBA proposed it in
1970, today's lawmakers may be more amenable to change in light of
the groundwork already laid by the STOCK Act and the additional
empirical evidence now available regarding the investment practices
of Congress's members. 274
In the course of its three-year study of the legislative branch,
the NYCBA's Special Committee on Congressional Ethics
interviewed 120 Senators and Representatives. 2 7 5 The interviews
and other data convinced the Committee that "the typical Member of

(reporting that,
congressional-earmarks-congressional-knowledge-stock-act
since 2008, thirty-three lawmakers "have directed more than $300 million in
earmarks and other spending provisions to dozens of public projects that are
next to or within about two miles of the lawmakers' own property"). According
to the Post, the lawmakers were able to certify that they (together with spouses)
lacked a "financial interest" in the earmarks because, in general, the increases
in the value of the properties were regarded as "incremental and indirect" and
were experienced "as a member of a class of landowners in the vicinity" of the
public works project. See id. (quoting House Ethics Committee advisory opinion
issued to lawmaker who sought an earmark to build a bus terminal and parkand-ride center near seven commercial properties he owned).
271. See Robert Pear, Insider Trading Bill Clears Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2012, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us
/politics/insider-trading-ban-for-lawmakers-clears-congress.html?_r=0.
272. See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signing the Stop Trading on
Congressional Knowledge Act 2012, in DAILY COMP. PRES. Docs. 247 (April 4,
2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200247/content
-detail.html; see also President Barack Obama, supra note 11.
273. NYCBA 1970 REPORT, supra note 16, at 69.
274. See supra notes 235-42 and accompanying text (detailing investigative
findings by the Washington Post).
275. NYCBA 1970 REPORT, supra note 16, at xxv.
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Congress has financial interests with some potential for clouding his
independence of judgment on legislation,"276 and that most of these
conflicts were "avoidable" because they were neither inherent (they
did not involve a status such as a homeowner, parent, or veteran),
politically dictated (they did not involve, for example, a "farmer
elected from an agricultural district"), nor personally necessary
(they did not involve "small, closely held family enterprises"). 277 The
Committee's basic thesis was "that an avoidable conflict of interest
should normally be avoided [and] ...

if not avoided, it should be

disclosed to the Member's colleagues and to the public and perhaps
should result in disqualification from voting or committee
service." 278
The Committee grounded its strong preference for "interest
avoidance by selective investment" in the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 279
After emphasizing the risk of impaired judgment that arises
whenever there is a temptation to serve personal interests, the
Committee opined:
The quality of specific results is immaterial.

. .

. Like other

fiduciaries, such as guardians, executors, lawyers, and agents,
the public trustee has a duty to avoid private interests which
cause even a risk that he will not be motivated solely by the
interests of the beneficiaries of his trust. Properly conceived,
conflict-of-interest regulation does not condemn bad actions so
much as it erects a system designed to protect a decisionmaking process. It is preventive and prophylactic. Its aim is
not detection and punishment of evil, but providing safeguards
which lessen the risk of the undesirable action. 280
The Committee further observed that "[t]he fiduciary concept makes
it unnecessary for our recommendations to be supported by evidence
that identifiable harm to the public has resulted" from such
avoidable financial conflicts. 281
Along with its general thesis of interest avoidance, the
Committee advanced several specific recommendations.
These
included:
Recommendation 2B - Each Member of Congress should
make every reasonable effort to utilize available investment

alternatives which minimize instances in which it may appear

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 44-46.
Id. at 47.
See id. at 61-63.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 52.
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that his official decisions may be influenced by personal
economic interests. 282
Recommendation 2D - Each house should adopt the
following rule: "When a Member is appointed to a committee,
he should, if reasonably possible, avoid all economic interests
which may be specifically affected by legislation within the
jurisdiction of his committee."283
Recommendation 2E - Each house of Congress should adopt
the following rule: "It shall be the duty of each committee to
establish rules governing financial interests of its members
and employees in matters coming before the committee." 284
To be sure, the NYCBA's general thesis and specific "interest
avoidance" recommendations both influenced and impacted some of
Congress's members and employees. Indeed, although it is difficult
to measure with any precision, it is quite likely that many
lawmakers and staffers took Recommendation 2B to heart; many
lawmakers have investment portfolios that avoid corporate stocks
altogether and others have placed their securities holdings into
qualified blind trusts.285 In addition, Recommendation 2D found its
way in the committee staff divestment rule that is now set out in
Senate Rule 37(7).286

Yet overall, the vast majority of lawmakers have pretty much
eschewed "interest avoidance" as a principal method for controlling
financial conflicts, at least with respect to stock investments in
individual companies. 287 But, even more avoidable and all the more
troubling are those securities investments in companies within an
industry over which a lawmaker's committee has jurisdiction. 2 88
Here the parallels between committee members and executive
branch officials are striking: lawmakers on committees such as
and
Services,
Financial
Banking,
Services,
Armed
Telecommunications are wrestling with the very same policy issues
confronting the officials at the Pentagon, Treasury, SEC, and FCC.
Greater parity could be achieved with a federal statute (or new
House and Senate rules) that would restrict members and their
senior staffs from owning securities in companies with business that

282. Id. at 63.
283. Id. at 68.
284. Id. at 71.
285. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
288. See O'Harrow Jr. & Keating, supra note 5 (observing that lawmakers
"try to get on the committees in which they have a vested interest," which
places them "in a better position of influencing the performance of their
investments ... or at least appearing to have that ability" (quoting Steve Ellis,
vice president of Taxpayers for Common Sense)).
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is directly and foreseeably affected by the work of any committee on
which the lawmaker holds membership.
2. Investment Limitations Applied More Broadly
In early 2012, as the STOCK Act bill was headed toward
passage in the Senate, nearly two-dozen senators sought to build on
the bill's core insider trading and transaction reporting
provisions. 289 The result was a bevy of proposed "good-government"
amendments. 290 Expressing his concern that the bill's chances for
passage were being jeopardized, Senator Lieberman invoked a Dr.
Seuss metaphor: "We don't want this bill, which does so many
important things, to be so loaded up that it falls by the wayside like
Thidwick's antlers."291 To prevent that from happening, the Senate
passed an order providing for an up-or-down vote on most of the
proposed amendments, but requiring a sixty-vote threshold and
limiting debate to two minutes equally divided between those
members in favor and those opposed. 292
In the course of the Senate's consideration of the twenty-two
amendments that were then pending on the STOCK Act bill,293
Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Jeff Merkley (D-OR) advanced
a proposal that would have placed a broad limitation on securities
investments by members and certain employees of the Senate. 294

289. See 158 CONG. REc. S1979 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Joseph Lieberman) (noting that the legislation being sent to the President
contained "several provisions that were added in the Senate or House to
strengthen the bill").
290. See 158 CONG. REC. S1980 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Joseph Lieberman) (noting that there had been twenty amendments to the
STOCK Act). Most of the proposed amendments, however, were voted down,
including Toomey amendment No. 1472 to permanently ban earmarks; Paul
amendment No. 1490 to require former lawmakers to forfeit federal retirement
benefits if they work as a lobbyist or engage in lobbying activities; and DeMint
amendment No. 1488 to express the sense of the Senate for a joint resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution that would impose term
limitations on lawmakers. See 158 CONG. REC. S290-310 (daily ed. Feb. 2,
2012).
291. 158 CONG. REc. S148 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2012) (statement of Sen. Joseph
Lieberman). As Senator Lieberman recounted, Thidwick the Big-HeartedMoose
told the story of animals in a forest who were warmly welcomed to take up
residence in a moose's antlers "until finally there is too much there and his
antlers fall off and they all fall to the ground." Id.
292. 158 CONG. REC. S290 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2012) (statement of Sen. Harry
Reid).
293. See id. at S290-91 (listing pending amendments).
294. Id. at S309 (statement of Sen. Sherrod Brown). Nearly twenty years
ago, similar legislation mandating divestiture had been proposed in the House.
See 141 CONG. REC. E731-01 (Mar. 29, 1995) (statement by Rep. Bernie Sanders
introducing H.R. 1356, "The Public Interest Legislation Act"). The bill, which
had five cosponsors, would have amended the EIGA to require lawmakers to
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Their amendment was termed the "Putting the People's Interests
First Act of 2012," and Senator Brown's advocacy was necessarily
brief:
Mr. President, the amendment Senator Merkley and I have
proposed would require all Senators and their senior staff to
sell individual stocks that create conflicts or to place their
investments in blind trusts. You can still invest in broadbased mutual funds. You can keep your ownership interest in
your family farm or small business.
If you are setting up a blind trust, you can instruct the trustee
to hold on to your stock in your family company.
Current Senate ethics rules require committee staff making
more than $25,000 a year to "divest [themselves] of any
substantial holdings which may be directly affected by the
actions of the committee for which [they work]."
All Senate Merkley and I are saying is, Members of the Senate
should hold ourselves to the same standard we already require
of our committee staff and executive branch employees.
As Senator Merkley said, baseball players cannot bet on their
games. We should not be able to hold stock in individual
companies and then vote on issues that affect our holdings. 295
Two members spoke in opposition. Senator Pat Toomey (RPenn.) disagreed with the "fundamental premise of this
amendment."2 96
He also expressed a specific concern with the
amendment's reach, stating:
I read the definition of the securities that would be covered
and as the securities attorneys have advised us on this-we
would be required to divest ourselves even of our investment
in a small family-owned business, a business that, perhaps,
has absolutely no market whatsoever for the equity, and we
would, nevertheless, be forced to sell that where there is no
buyer.
I think that is a very unreasonable standard, so I would urge a
"no" vote on this amendment.29 7
The second opponent was Senator Lieberman, who expressed the
view that a new divestment requirement would be unnecessary in
divest themselves of any asset or interest which exceed $1,000 in real property
(other than a personal residence) or in any form of securities, or place such
assets in a qualified blind trust. Id.
295. Id. at S295, S309 (statement of Sen. Sherrod Brown) (alterations in

original).
296. Id. at S309 (statement of Sen. Pat Toomey).
297. Id.
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light of the STOCK Act's requirement for prompt (no later than
forty-five days) reporting of securities purchases and sales:
This amendment would take Congress from where we have
always been and are going to be after this law passes. In
pursuit of disclosure and transparency, sunshine is the best
guarantee of integrity. This would be the first time I am
aware of that in the legislative branch we would require
divestment of personal holdings. For that reason, I oppose the
amendment.
Remember, in the underlying bill we have increased the
public's access to information about our holdings and our
transactions. Ultimately, that knowledge ought to be enough
to guarantee the public or to energize the public to make sure
we are following the highest ethical norms. Divestment, in my
opinion, is a step too far. 298
The proposed "Putting People First Act" was defeated by a
Senate vote of 26-73.299 But that loss should not seal the proposal's
fate. Although its details and definitions could be refined after
additional consideration, the proposed legislation's general
prohibition had a commendable simplicity:
A covered person shall be prohibited from holding and shall
divest themselves of any covered investment that is directly,
reasonably, and foreseeably affected by the official actions of
such covered person, to avoid any conflict of interest, or the
appearance thereof. Any divestiture shall occur within a
reasonable period of time. 300
The term "covered person" included members and senior staff of the
Senate (whose annual base pay exceeded $120,000) as well as their
spouses and dependents. 301 And the term "covered investment" was
defined expansively to mean "investment in securities in any
company, any comparable economic interest acquired through
synthetic means such as the use of derivatives, or short selling any
publicly traded securities." 3 0 2 But the general prohibition applied
neither to broad-based investments (such as shares in diversified
mutual funds) nor to a spouse's investments in the securities of the
company in which the spouse is employed. The proposed legislation
also permitted the Senate Ethics Committee to authorize covered
persons, "on a case-by-case basis," to place their securities holdings

298. Id. (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman).
299. 158 CONG. REc. S309 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2012).
300. 158 CONG. REc. S243 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2012).
301.

Id.

302. Id.
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in a qualified blind trust.303 In the event of a covered person's
violation of the general prohibition, the Senate Ethics Committee
was required to notify the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia, and knowing violations could warrant a fine of no more
than $50,000.304
A federal statute (or new House or Senate rules) along the lines
proposed for the STOCK Act would be an effective reminder to
Congress's members and employees that they serve in a fiduciary
capacity. And while a prophylactic measure such as this would
hardly solve every agency problem in politics, it would be a
substantial step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION

Congress has long viewed its members' personal financial stake
in legislative decisions as an extraneous factor that can-except in
rare cases-be set aside for the good of the public. Yet federal law
does not leave government officials in the other two branches
completely to the nature of their better angels. Nor does state
corporate law leave interested directors entirely on their own to
wrestle away financial conflicts in the course of their business
judgments. Although all fiduciaries are supposed to act solely for
the benefit of their entrustors and never for the benefit of
themselves, prophylactic rules are necessary to ensure that
fiduciaries do, in fact, act loyally. Congress imposes stringent
financial conflict-of-interest restraints on executive and judicial
officers and employees, and it should regulate itself with a similar
fidelity to fiduciary principles.

303. See supra note 231 (discussing qualified blind trusts).
304. 158 CONG. REC. S243 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2012).

